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Chapter I – Black Markets and Crime 
 
I. Introduction 
Since Becker’s seminal work (1968), economists have investigated the 
determinants of crime using of a cost-benefit analysis. But, while extensive 
research has focused on incentives related to sanctions, deterrence and legal labor 
market opportunities, the effects of Black Markets (i.e. markets in which goods 
and services are illegally traded) on crime have been generally overlooked.  
Two main obstacles have hindered such an analysis. First, black markets are 
by definition clandestine. Hence, these are very hard to measure. Secondly, these 
markets are not randomly assigned to geographic locations, but rather 
endogenously located, following existing economic trends or cross-sectional area 
characteristics. 
This PhD thesis aims to partially fill this gap. I investigate the effects on 
criminal activity of 1) markets for stolen goods and 2) markets for illegal drugs. 
I start by focusing on pawnshops, widespread legal markets often associated 
with the illicit trade of stolen property. I build a novel panel dataset of 2,200 US 
counties (94 % of US population coverage). I match FBI information to 
pawnshops’ presence. Within-county estimates reveal that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the number of pawnshops is associated with 0.05 to 0.1 
standard deviation increase in property thefts. Falsification tests add support for 
the hypothesis of the paper: the correlation between pawnshops and crime is only 
isolated to the case of property thefts. Motor-vehicle thefts are unaffected, 
plausibly because these shops do not accept this type of item. No effect is ever 
 8 
detected on any other violent crime, such as murders, aggravated assaults and 
rapes.  
To address reverse causality issues, I then use a quasi-experimental design. I 
show that the effects of rising gold prices on burglaries are amplified by the 
predetermined prevalence of these businesses within a county. The analysis 
suggests that pawnshops increase the expected benefits from crime by providing a 
deeper market for stolen goods. 
The rest of the PhD thesis investigates the effects of illegal drugs markets on 
crime. I focus on crystal methamphetamines, one of the most dangerous drugs in 
the United States. I use as a source of exogenous variation Over-the-Counter 
(OTC) restrictions to meth’s critical inputs of production. Heavy crystal-meth 
addicts typically produce this substance in clandestine “home-labs”, mainly to 
sustain their habit. Several quasi-experimental designs are performed on a newly 
assembled panel dataset. This unveils the interlinkages between drugs and 
criminal activity due to a unique combination of Drugs Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) and FBI county-level information.  
Chapter III investigates the direct effect OTC restrictions on crime. A 
difference-in differences (DD) design shows that OTC restrictions led to a decline 
of 5% to 10% in both property and violent crimes. The effects of the law are 
stronger (i.e. more negative) in rural counties where – typically – meth production 
and abuse takes place. This chapter also shows a variety of robustness checks and 
placebo tests. 
Chapter IV investigates the mechanisms behind the reduction in crime. I detect 
a 38% drop in operating meth-labs, driven by small-medium quantity labs. I do 
not detect strong signs of relocation of criminal activity across states’ borders, 
substitution in the demand or supply of other illegal substances, crackdown of 
police on meth-abusers.  
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I then propose a simple theoretical framework that matches qualitative features 
of this clandestine market. I model the decision process of a typical “meth-head” 
hit by OTC restrictions via an unexpected crystal-meth price-shock. This 
framework guides and sharpens the interpretation of the results, providing an 
additional set of testable predictions. These are corroborated by the subsequent 
empirical analysis or by further descriptive/qualitative evidence. OTC restrictions 
led to: i) a drop in meth consumption, ii) an increase in voluntary meth-related 
hospitalizations associated with detox, withdrawal symptoms and rehab, iii) 
heterogeneous and non-monotonic effects on criminal activity across US states.  
Chapter V aims to estimate the effect of the opening/closing or entry/exit of an 
additional meth-lab on crime. I use a combination of diff-in-diff and IV designs. 
First, I present the baseline empirical strategy and the related results. Then, I 
discuss potential threats to identification, proposing and implementing alternative 
approaches with the scope of reducing concerns related to the violation of the 
exclusion restriction. I detect an elasticity of both property and violent crimes to 
meth-labs in the range of .1 to.3. Finally, I also present: i) an additional DD 
design exploiting a subsequent federal act, ii) the examination of the long-run 
effects of OTC restrictions on crime. 
Overall, this work supports the hypothesis that OTC regulations “capped the 
meth-epidemic”, slowing-down the spiral of heavy drugs’ abuse and associated 
criminal behavior soaring “under the influence” of this powerful substance. 
Ultimately, this thesis suggests that including in Becker “cost-benefit” framework 
(1968) the direct criminogenic effects arising from drug abuse, might lead to a 
deeper understanding of criminal behavior’s production function. 
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Chapter II – The Effect of Stolen Goods Markets on Crime: Pawnshops, 
Property Thefts and the Gold Rush of the 2000s 
                                                     By ROCCO D’ESTE 
This chapter investigates the effects of stolen goods markets on crime. I focus 
on pawnshops, assembling a novel dataset encompassing 2,200 US counties from 
1997 to 2010. Within-county estimates reveal that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the number of pawnshops is associated with 0.05 to 0.1 standard 
deviation increase in property thefts. Using a quasi-experimental design, I then 
show that the effects of rising gold prices on burglaries are amplified by the 
predetermined prevalence of these businesses within a county. This suggests that 
pawnshops increase the expected benefits from crime by providing a deeper 
market for stolen goods. 
 
I. Introduction  
Theft crimes represent a substantial social cost to society. In 2010, the United 
States experienced one theft every 40.5 seconds, with a total of 9.5 million crimes 
and an estimated economic loss for victims of almost $16 billion (FBI, 2010)1. 
Personal items were stolen in almost 85 percent of cases, strongly suggesting that 
burglars need a market in which to convert these goods into cash (Walters et al., 
2013). In particular, this raises the hypothesis that the local availability of stolen 
goods markets may affect criminal behavior by reducing theft-related transaction 
costs and by raising the expected benefits deriving from illegal activity (Sutton, 
2010). 
Since Becker’s seminal work (1968), economists have investigated the 
determinants of crime using of a cost-benefit analysis. But, while extensive 
research has focused on incentives related to sanctions, deterrence and legal labor 
                                                
 
     1 http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/offenses-known-to-
law-enforcement/standard-links/national-data  
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market opportunities,2 the effects of stolen good markets on crime have been 
generally overlooked. Two main obstacles have hindered such an analysis. First, 
markets for stolen property are by definition clandestine and – hence – very hard 
to measure. Secondly, these markets are not randomly assigned to geographic 
locations, but rather endogenously located, following existing economic trends or 
cross-sectional area characteristics. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on crime by analyzing this 
issue through the channel of pawnshops, widespread legal markets often 
associated with the illicit trade of stolen property. I build a novel panel crime-
related dataset, collecting information on 8 reported crimes and on the number of 
pawnshops for 2,200 US counties in 50 states, from 1997 to 2010. I hence focus 
on the effects that these businesses have on the proliferation of illegal activity.  
I address endogeneity concerns in multiple ways. First, I use a fixed effects 
framework, including in the analysis a wide set of county, time-varying, socio-
economic controls.3 Then, I exploit the rise of gold prices as a quasi–natural 
experiment, interacting gold prices with the initial concentration of pawnshops in 
a county, fixed to the first year of the sample. The hypothesis is that shifts in the 
resale value of gold will cause more property thefts in counties with a higher 
concentration of businesses that generate a big part of their profits by trading gold 
products such as rings, necklaces and bracelets. 
In the first part of the paper I rely on within-county variation in the number of 
pawnshops to explain within-county variation in the number of reported crimes. 
Ordinary least square estimates reveal a significant effect of these businesses on 
two theft-crimes: larceny and burglary. A marginal increase of pawnshops in a 
county is associated with 6 more property thefts in the same county. The 
                                                
2 See Chalfin and McCrary (2013) for a detailed literature review. 
     3 Please refer to the “Data and Empirical Analysis” section for a detailed description of all controls used in 
the analysis. 
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magnitude of the results is larger if I consider the presence of geographical 
spillovers: one pawnshop more in a state is associated with 36 more property 
thefts in a county belonging to the same state. To put these results into 
perspective, a one-standard-deviation increase in the number of pawnshops is 
associated with 0.05 to 0.1 standard deviation increase in property thefts.  
These findings are robust to extensive checks, such as the clustering of 
standard errors at different levels, sensitivity analysis with respect to outliers, 
weighting the regression by a measure of the quality of the information on 
reported crimes and excluding from the sample highly populated counties. 
Falsification tests add support for the hypothesis of the paper: in fact, the 
correlation between pawnshops and crime is only isolated to the case of property 
thefts. In particular, motor-vehicle thefts are unaffected, plausibly because these 
shops do not accept this type of item. Moreover, no effect is ever detected on any 
other violent crime, such as murders, aggravated assaults and rapes. 
The lack of random assignment poses two different threats to the 
identification of a causal parameter. First, results might be driven by the omission 
of confounding county-specific and time-varying unobservables. Nevertheless, 
the coefficients of interest are almost unaffected by the inclusion of 18 socio-
economic controls, reducing concerns that selection on unobservables is mainly 
driving the results.  
The second econometric concern is related to the bias arising due to reverse 
causality: increases in property thefts may lead to the opening of additional 
pawnshops. I address this issue in the last section of the paper, by introducing the 
interaction between gold prices and the concentration of pawnshops in a county, 
fixed to the first year of the sample. 
Gold is the major source of pawnbrokers’ business, representing a high 
percentage of the value of all pledges (Bos et al, 2012). The demand for gold 
materializes through trade in jewelry, which is frequently melted down by 
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pawnbrokers through a “refinement” process. During this process, professional 
outfits remove impurities from metal until they get a metal that is closer to being 
pure gold and, therefore, cannot be traced when re-sold. In this way, stolen 
jewelry can disappear forever via the counters of pawnshops. 
The empirical analysis shows that a one standard deviation increase in the 
initial concentration of pawnshops in a county increases the effect of gold prices 
on burglaries by 0.05 to 0.10 standard deviations, with no effect detected on 
motor-vehicle thefts or any other crimes.  
I then include in the analysis the interaction between each socio-economic 
county observable – fixed at the first year of the sample – and gold prices. This 
specification attempts to control for other confounding channels through which 
the rise of gold prices might have affected the proliferation of burglaries, with 
different trends in different counties. Results are robust to this and to other 
specifications. Overall, the analysis supports the hypothesis that these businesses 
can amplify the expected benefits of thefts by providing a deeper market for 
stolen goods.   
As a final falsification test, I include the interaction between the initial 
concentration of pawnshops and copper prices, without detecting any positive 
effect on burglaries. This is consistent with the fact that pawnshops do not 
commonly trade copper, even if criminals heavily target objects made with this 
metal. The resale market for copper is indeed more heavily concentrated around 
dedicated scrap metal dealers.4 
The results in my empirical analysis are important both for researchers and 
policy makers.  
From a research perspective, this paper contributes to the existing literature on 
crime in two novel ways.  First, this is one the first investigation of the effects of 
                                                
4 See Sidebottom (2011), or Cardoso et al (2013). 
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stolen goods markets on criminal activity.5 This paper is hence closely related to 
an unpublished PhD dissertation chapter by Thomas J. Miles (2007), who finds a 
positive effect of pawnshops on crime on a cross section of US counties, in the 
year 1996. He addresses endogeneity issues using state-level variation in the 
maximum interest rate allowed to pawnbrokers, an interesting approach 
nevertheless characterized by some data limitations.6 
Second, this is one of the first papers that analyses the effects of a change in 
crime’s expected benefits, exploiting the rise in gold and copper prices as a quasi-
natural experiment. This work is hence closely related to Draca, Koutmeridis and 
Machin (2014). Their findings support the hypothesis that crimes are highly 
responsive to consumer and scrap metal prices, suggesting that, as potential 
takings from thefts rise with prices, criminals switch into crimes that yield a 
higher return. 
From a policy perspective, these findings suggest the need for a closer 
monitoring of these shops by local authorities. This monitoring, by reducing the 
latent demand for stolen properties, should reduce the supply of crime in 
pawnshops’ proximity. This is in line with the decision of some municipalities in 
the Unites States to apply stricter rules on this business, increasing the penalties in 
                                                
5 Different studies have analysed a wide set of crime's potential determinants. Among these: the effect of 
police and incarceration (Levitt 1997, Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004, Klick and Tabarrok 2005, Levitt 
1996, Levitt 1998, Helland and Tabarrok 2007, Drago, Galbiati and Vertova 2009, Lee and McCrary 2009, 
Draca, Machin and Witt 2011), conditions in prisons (Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich 2003), parole and bail 
institutions (Kuziemko 2007), education (Western, Kling and Weiman 2001, Lochner and Moretti 2004), 
social interactions and peer effects (Case and Katz 1991, Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 1996, Gaviria 
and Raphael 2001, Kling, Ludwig and Katz 2005, Jacob and Lefgren 2003, Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen 
2009), family circumstances (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999, Donohue and Levitt 2001). Economists have also 
focused on the effect of criminal histories on labour market outcomes (Grogger 1995, Kling 2006), the 
impact of unemployment and wages on crime (Grogger 1998, Raphael andWinter- Ebmer 2001), the strategic 
interplay between violent and property crime (Silverman 2004), the optimal law enforcement (Polinsky and 
Shavell 2000, Eeckhout, Persico and Todd 2009), the immigration status (Bianchi, Buonanno and Pinotti 
2012), the impact of violent movies and pornography on violent crimes (Dahl and Della Vigna 2009 and 
Bhuller, Havnes, Leuven and Mogstad 2011). 
6 In particular, the analysis is limited to only one year of data (1996). This, along side the use of a state-
level instrument, does not allow for the inclusion of county nor state fixed-effects. In practice, any 
county/state unobservable characteristics, related to the number of pawnshops, crime and the state’s decision 
of setting a particular interest rate might be a confounding factor in the analysis. 
 15 
case of poor documentation of all transactions made by pawnbrokers.7 For these 
reasons, new policies are being implemented. These measures require 
pawnbrokers to share their records with authorities on a daily basis, using a free 
online reporting system, including jewelry and used electronic goods that can be 
tracked by serial numbers.8  
More broadly, this study highlights the scope to further investigate, separate 
and quantify the effects that other potential markets such as junkyards, flea 
markets, EBay, Craigslist and the dark web could have on the proliferation of 
illegal activity.9 In fact, these and other markets may affect criminals’ incentives 
by reducing theft-related transaction costs, by increasing the expected benefits 
from thefts, by amplifying the effects of world prices fluctuations of metals and 
technological goods and – in some cases – by selling weapons, illicit drugs and 
other illegal products.10 These and other interesting aspects are hence left for 
future research. 
This paper unfolds as follows. Section II provides some institutional 
background on pawnshops. Section III presents the data and lays out the initial 
econometric framework, it reports the findings for that framework and provides 
various robustness checks and heterogeneity in the results. Section IV introduces 
the role of gold in the quasi-natural experiment, outlines the research design and 
presents the results. Section V concludes. 
                                                
7 See the next section for more background information on pawnshops’ regulation. 
8  See for example: http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local/plan-would-require-some-secondhand-
stores-to-sha-1/nRkKz/?__federated=1 or http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/scranton-to-require-stricter-rules-
for-pawn-shops-1.1658773  
9 See FBI report on the dark web: http://www.fbi.gov/news/podcasts/thisweek/the-dark-web.mp3/view  
10  See for example: http://www.zdnet.com/article/beyond-silk-road-2-0-over-400-dark-web-tor-sites-
seized-by-fbi/  
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II. Institutional Background  
Pawnshops, payday loans and check-cashing outlets are all businesses that 
provide credit to “unbanked” clients at very high interest rates.11 Among these 
activities, pawnbrokers offer a unique service: they supply instant cash in 
exchange for taking physical possession of the client’s personal property.  
The standard procedure begins with an assessment of the monetary value of 
the client’s item. If the client accepts the offer, she can either directly sell the item 
to the pawnbroker or she can ask for a loan, using the pledge as a collateral. 
Usually, the offer ranges from 30 to 75 per cent of the market value of the pledge, 
with the average loan value being $100. The pawnbroker holds the personal item 
in custody until the maturity date of the loan, typically two months later. If the 
client does not return to reclaim the pledged item, ownership of the item passes to 
the pawnbroker.12 
Several dynamics can turn a pawnshop into a market for stolen goods (Sutton, 
2010). First of all, even if pawnbrokers assume the risk that an item might have 
been stolen, they often only loose the collateral and the amount loaned in case 
where the police seize the item.13 Competition may also reduce a pawnbroker’s 
incentive to question items of uncertain origin. As one pawnbroker put it: “If he’s 
coming in my store with a VCR, I’m not asking him where he got it. It’s the 
police’s job to find out if it’s stolen, not mine. You don’t ask where things come 
                                                
11 U.S. households purchased more than $40 billion in high-cost short-term loans using the “fringe banking 
sector” in 2007, Fellowes and Mabanta (2008). Even if there is no official and reliable estimate of the total 
number of clients, industry reports suggest that 34 million adults demanded the services of these companies. 
The sector consists of several types of high-cost lenders, but two comprise the dominant portion: payday 
lenders and pawnshops. In 2007 pawnshops made 42 million transactions for an overall value of 2.5 billion 
dollars. The maximum interest rate set by pawnbrokers and payday lenders is generally regulated at the state 
level. For a complete review of pawnshops' operating system see Shackman and Tenney (2006). 
12 Alternatively, the pawnbroker becomes the owner of the item as soon as the sale process ends. About 80 
per cent of pawn loans are repaid and repeat customers account for much of the loan volume. Moreover, it is 
common for a customer to use the same pledge as collateral to obtain sequential loans (Avery, 2011). 
13 The charge for criminal possession depends on the evidence of the pawnbroker being aware of the 
illegal origin of the item, a fact that is usually very difficult to establish. See for example: 
http://www.lacriminaldefenseattorney.com/Legal-Dictionary/F/FA-FIRE/Fence.aspx 
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from. If you don’t take those, the guy down the street will” (Glover and Larubbia, 
1996). Finally, the pawnbroker could explicitly facilitate the sale of stolen goods 
in his shop (fencing),14 exploiting the lack of strict law enforcement from local 
authorities or, for example, the fact that most stolen goods lack of a unique 
identifier and are hard to recognize by police or by the victims.15 
For all these reasons, laws in many jurisdictions strictly regulate pawnbrokers’ 
activities. These laws usually require a photo identification of the client (such as a 
driver’s license or government-issued identity document), as well as a “holding” 
period on the item purchased by the pawnbroker, to allow local law enforcement 
authorities to track stolen items. Pawnshops must also regularly send to police a 
list of all newly pawned items and, if possible, any associated serial number. 
Despite the existence of these laws, various investigative reports add support 
to the hypothesis of a close link between pawnshops and criminal activity. Glover 
and Larrubia used the pawnshops-level transaction data to rank pawnshops clients 
by the number of transactions made in 1996. Thirty-nine of the top fifty clients 
had criminal arrest records, often related to burglary, theft, or related offenses.16 
                                                
14 Police efforts have indicated that some pawnbrokers are involved in fencing. For example, in the US, 
the Sarasota Police Department, Venice Police Department and North Port Police Department assisted with 
the undercover operation to sell gold jewelry to each business. Many were found to be in compliance. 
However, a number of businesses operated under a 'no questions asked' policy, making no attempt to properly 
document the seller information, record the items being purchased or obtain the seller's fingerprint (Bill, 
2011). 
15 Wright and Decker (1994) interviewing burglars in the St. Louis area, describe different mechanisms 
through which pawnshops may be used to quickly convert stolen goods into cash. First, even if a burglar must 
provide his name, address, and a form of identification, jurisdictions rarely make full use of this information. 
Moreover, these requirements can be easily deceived. The burglar may provide false information (Glover and 
Larrubia, 1996) or use false identification when needed. Alternatively, some burglars reported persuading 
friends to pawn the items for them, reducing the likelihood that a pawnbroker would not accept the item from 
a suspicious client (Wright and Decker, 1994). Finally, jewelry such as rings, bracelets and necklaces can 
easily be melted down, transforming forever stolen items into unrecognizable bars of precious metal (Sutton, 
2010).  
   16 In a subsequent study Wallace (1997) describes how pawnshops may enable few highly motivated 
criminals to commit many offenses. For example, an unemployed man visited a single pawnshop 38 times in 
less than two months and pawned, among other items, thirteen women’s rings, ten men’s rings, eleven 
necklaces, nine cameras, six watches, three VCRs, and two televisions. The day after his last visit to the 
pawnshop, the man was arrested for burglary. Another police survey of frequent pawners produced like 
findings in Portland, Oregon. 90 per cent of these pawners were chronic drug users with long criminal 
records (Hammond 1997). 
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Fass and Francis (2005) used a similar approach to analyze a database of all pawn 
transactions recorded by the Dallas Police Department (DPD) during the six-year 
period from January 1, 1991, through December 31, 1996.17 The 14,500 people 
pawning 30 times or more during the period “were two to three times more likely 
to have been convicted for theft, larceny, burglary, or robbery than those who 
pawned once or twice.”18 
Overall, this evidence points towards pawnshops being a major channel for 
the intermediation of stolen goods. 
III. Data and Empirical Analysis 
Pawnbrokers have often been associated with fencing. While pawnbrokers do 
not like this characterization of their business, police efforts have indicated that 
some pawnbrokers are involved in fencing. For example, in the US, the Sarasota 
Police Department, Venice Police Department and North Port Police Department 
assisted with the undercover operation to sell gold jewelry to each business. Many 
were found to be in compliance. However, a number of businesses operated under 
a ‘no questions asked’ policy, making no attempt to properly document the seller 
information, record the items being purchased or obtain the seller’s fingerprint, all 
of which are state requirements”. (Bill, 2011) 
This paper focuses on a panel of 2,200 US Counties, in 50 States from 1997 to 
2010.19 The final dataset is obtained merging information from several sources. 
                                                
17 Each transaction shows a pawn ticket number, a client’s identification number, shop’s identification 
number, transaction date, and classification code for items pawned.  
    18 Within the sample of the top 100 pawnshops’ clients, 83 individuals had arrest records. “Of these, 58 had 
accumulated 300 convictions for property as well as other offenses, or an average of 5.2 arrests per 
individual. Most property crime arrests, 74 per cent, were for theft, 11 per cent for burglary of vehicles, 7 per 
cent for burglary of homes or businesses, 5 per cent for robbery, and the rest for forgery and car theft. Other 
infractions mainly involved drug possession (23 per cent) or driving without a license (23 per cent).” A 
similar analysis, conducted by Comeau and Klofas (2012) for the city of Rochester, NY shows equivalent 
evidence.  
19 This represents almost 70% of all the US counties. The final sample is obtained merging NACJD county 
data on reported crimes and Infogroup data on pawnshops. Missing observations on both datasets and the 
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Data on crime comes from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data.20 
County-level files are created by NACJD based on agency records in a file 
obtained from the FBI that also provides aggregated county totals. Eight different 
types of crimes are reported: larceny, burglary, robbery, motor-vehicle theft, 
murder, aggravated assault, rape and arson.21  
Infogroup Academic provided the overall number of pawnshops by county, 
per year. The data gathering process follows a six-step procedure. In the 
compilation phase, data is taken directly from sources such as: government, 
public company filings, utility Information, tourism directories, web compilation 
and RSS feeds. The second step in the process is the address standardization 
process followed by a phone verification phase with 40 million calls made per 
year. The last three phases include a standardization of elements and a duplicate 
removal, an enhanced content and a final quality check.22  
Table I reports crime-related summary statistics, expressed by county and 
normalized per 100,000 people. The average number of pawnshops per county is 
5.88, with a standard deviation of 6.32. Larceny is the most common theft crime, 
followed by burglary and motor vehicles theft.23 Violent crimes and arson are less 
                                                                                                                                
presence of data-corruption and differences in counties’ names and identifiers determines the final size of the 
dataset. 
20  Data are downloadable at: 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/NACJD/guides/ucr.html#desc_cl. (Accessed date: December 
2012) 
21 NACJD imputes missing data and then aggregates the data to the county-level. The FBI definition of the 
eight types of crime, as well as the explanation of the hierarchy rule, can be found in the data appendix.  
22 More information is available at http://lp.infogroup.com/academic. The sample has an average of 9800 
pawnshops per year. These numbers are confirmed by other studies. See - for example - Fellowees and 
Mabanta (2008), Shackman and Tenney (2006). 
23 In the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, property crime includes the offenses of 
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. The property crime category includes arson because 
the offense involves the destruction of property; however, arson victims may be subjected to force. Because 
of limited participation and varying collection procedures by local law enforcement agencies, only limited 
data are available for arson. In the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, violent crime is 
composed of four offenses: murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault. Violent crimes are defined in the UCR Program as those offenses that involve force or threat of force. 
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frequent, with the lowest reported crime being murder, with an average of 3.86 
and a standard deviation of 5.43.  
[TABLE I] 
I also add to the analysis a comprehensive set of county time-varying socio-
economic controls, obtained from the US Census Bureau24 and from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics-Current Population Survey.25  
I include income per capita, percentage of people below the poverty line, 
percentage of unemployment, social security recipients and the average monthly 
payment per subsidy. Given the type of credit service provided by pawnshops, I 
add commercial banks and saving institutions per capita. These controls, together 
with the amount of banking and saving deposits, aim to capture time varying 
confounding unobservables, related to both the financial penetration in the county 
and the relative presence of crime. I also include population density and the 
racial/ethnic composition in the county, which implicitly controls for the presence 
of possible confounding migration patterns.26 
Empirical Analysis 
 
I begin by estimating the following OLS equation: 
𝑦!,!,! = 𝛼!   + 𝛾! + 𝜇! ∗ year+ 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! + #𝑝𝑎𝑤𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑠!,!,!𝛽! + 𝜖!,!,!                              (1) 
 
where i indicates the county, s the state and t the year. The outcome of interest 
is the number of reported crimes. The analysis focuses on 𝛽!, the relationship 
                                                
24 I use http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa.shtml. (Accessed date: December 2012) 
25 Descriptive statistics of all the controls included in the analysis are shown in Table A1 of the Appendix.  
26 The racial origin is defined according to four categories: White, Black, Asian and Indian American. 
Moreover each race is divided into Hispanic or Not Hispanic ethnic origin. 
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between pawnshops and crime.27 Both measures are expressed in per capita terms. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
The inclusion of county fixed effects 𝛼!  controls for time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics related to the changes in both pawnshops and crime. Year fixed 
effects 𝛾! , state linear trends 𝜇! ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  and a vector of county time-varying 
socioeconomic controls 𝑋!,!,!! ,  are also included. 
Results  
 
Tables II A and II B show the estimates of 𝛽! for the pooled measure of theft-
related crimes (obtained by summing up larceny, burglary, robbery and motor-
vehicle theft) and for non-theft crimes (murder, aggravated assault, rape, arson). 
Column 1 shows the baseline specification with year fixed effects and state linear 
trends included. In column 2 I add county fixed effects, while in column 3 I 
include all county time-varying observables. 
[TABLE II A – II B] 
The inclusion of county fixed effects reduces the magnitude of the pawnshops 
coefficients both for theft-related crimes (Column 2, Table II A) and for non-theft 
crimes (Column 2, Table II B). This indicates the presence of positive selection of 
pawnshops in counties with high levels of crime.  
The within county estimate for theft-related crimes is 6.47 significant at the 
1% level. Moreover, the inclusion of all county time-varying observables barely 
affects this estimate: the coefficient is 6.1 significant at the 1%. To put results into 
perspective, this indicates that an increase of one pawnshop in a county is 
                                                
27 The coefficient 𝛽! is identified using within county variation in pawnshops per capita. 40% of the 
observations display a change in the number of pawnshops from t-1, with this variation being distributed 
across 70% of the counties in the sample.  
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associated with an increase of more than 6 theft-related crimes in the same 
county.28 Conversely, Table II B shows no significant effects of pawnshops on 
non-theft crimes, once county fixed effects are included in the analysis.   
Table III A and III B presents the breakdown by type of crime for theft and 
non-theft crimes, respectively.  
[TABLE III A – III B] 
All fixed effects and all county observables are included in each regression. I 
detect a positive and significant effect only for larcenies and burglaries. The 
coefficient of pawnshops on larcenies is 4.6, significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient on burglaries is 1.5 and it is significant at the 5% level. No effect is 
detected on robberies, motor-vehicle thefts or other non-theft related crimes. 
Selection on Unobservables 
 
Given the lack of random assignment, I cannot exclude the possibility that the 
omission of some time-variant unobservables might be driving the results on 
larcenies and burglaries.  
A possible way to quantify the extent of this concern is to use the Altonji et al. 
(2005) method of assessing selection on unobservables using selection on 
observables. The intuition behind the test is to measure how strong the selection 
on unobservables must be relative to the selection on observables in order to 
explain away the effects. This strategy relies on a comparison between a 
regression run with potentially confounding factors controlled for, and one 
                                                
28 A one standard deviation increase in the number of pawnshops in a county is associated with a 0.05 
standard deviation increase in the number of theft crimes in the same county. 
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without.29 A rule of thumb is that any ratio above 1 is acceptable, as it indicates 
that selection on unobservables must be larger than selection on observables in 
order to invalidate the results (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2012). In my specification, 
the Altonjii ratio exceeds 20 for the measure of pooled theft-related crimes. 
Robustness Checks 
 
Table IV presents robustness checks for larceny (Row 1) and burglary (Row 2).  
[TABLE IV] 
   Column 1 reports the coefficient when I cluster standard errors at the state level, 
column 2 shows the results with two-way double clustering at county-year level, 
taking into account both autocorrelation of the error structure within county over 
time and the spatial correlation in each year across counties. In column 3 I weight 
the regression by the coverage indicator reported by the agency, a measure of the 
reliability of the information on crime available to the researcher.30 Finally, I 
perform two tests to check the sensitivity to outliers. Column 4 reveals estimates 
for the sample that drops counties in the top 1% of the pawnshops per capita 
distribution. Column 5 presents estimates for the sample that does not include the 
counties in the top 1% of the population distribution.31, 32 The stability of the 
coefficient is shown across all different specifications. 
                                                
29 Let c denote the estimate with controls, and nc denote the estimate without controls. The Altonji ratio is 
computed as | !!  !!!!!" |. 
30 The Coverage Indicator variable represents the proportion of county data that is not imputed for a given 
year. The indicator ranges from 100, indicating that all ORIs in the county reported for 12 months in the year, 
to 0, indicating that all data in the county are based on estimates, not reported data. I exclude observations for 
which the coverage indicator equals 0. 
31 I also eliminate from the sample the top 10%, 20% and 30% of the most populous counties to check 
whether the result is driven by big cities. Results are stable across all specifications and are omitted only for 
brevity considerations. 
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Heterogeneity in the Results 
 
It is plausible that the transaction costs associated with using pawnshops could 
vary by population density. The anonymity of a big city might in fact amplify the 
likelihood of pawnshops being a convenient destination for stolen goods. In rural 
and less densely populated areas, pawnshops might be far from the crime scene. 
Moreover, in these areas criminal activity is generally less frequent, and residents 
are more willing to defend the interests of the members of their communities. 
Such considerations could undermine burglars’ incentives to try to use a local 
pawnshop to sell stolen goods and, hence, to commit a burglary in its proximity.  
I investigate for the possible presence of heterogeneous effects performing a 
sub group analysis, splitting the sample into “low” and “high” population density 
counties. The two categories are computed with respect to the median density in 
the sample. 
[TABLE V] 
Table V shows results in line with the hypothesis that population density can 
amplify the effects of pawnshops on crime. For the case of larceny, the coefficient 
is 10.97 and is significant at the 1% level in high densely populated counties, 
while it is 3.32 significant at the 10% in low-density counties. I detect a similar 
pattern in the case of burglaries (columns 3 and 4) 
Geographical Spillovers  
 
My initial empirical analysis focused on understanding the effects of within-
county changes in pawnshops per capita on the changes of theft crimes in the 
                                                                                                                                
32  Table A2 shows the results for larcenies and burglaries of a more demanding estimation strategy 
including county-linear trends. The coefficient for larceny is 2.3, still significant at the 10% level. For the 
case of burglaries, the coefficient is 0.8 with a p-value of 16%. 
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same county. I now extend the analysis in order to detect the possible presence of 
geographical spillover effects of pawnshops on criminal activity. 
I construct a measure of pawnshops per capita at the state level, excluding 
from this measure the concentration of pawnshops in county i, (the county where 
crime is measured). Table VI shows the results of this specification. 
[TABLE VI] 
The inclusion of the state-level variable does not affect the earlier estimates 
related to pawnshops per capita in a county (first row of Table VI). Moreover, I 
find a large and significant coefficient of pawnshops the state level on larceny 
(22.5 significant at the 10 % level), and on burglaries (14.01 significant at the 1% 
level).33 
IV. Responses to Gold Prices  
In this section I further address the endogeneity of pawnshops to crime 
exploiting the exogenous rise in gold prices as a quasi-natural experiment. Before 
presenting the results I first describe the various mechanisms behind the salience 
of gold. Then, I define the identification strategy and show the results. 
Demand side 
 
Gold-related goods have always been the primary determinant of pawnbrokers’ 
profits. Bos et al. (2012) show that in the US 34% of male and 63% of female 
                                                
33 Previous research involving interviews with burglars suggests that the presence of stolen goods markets 
might affect their choice of whether and where to commit a theft. Knowing that the probability of being 
caught increases while stolen property is still in their possession, burglars seem to prefer to commit a theft at 
a maximum distance of half an hour by car from the envisaged resale point. Nevertheless, burglars might take 
the risk of traveling far from the crime scene, plausibly to avoid suspicions about the origin of the item or to 
outdistance the good from the place where it was stolen (Sutton, 2010).  
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clients used jewelry as part of the pledge in pawn transactions, with gold 
representing roughly 80 percent of the value of all pledges.  
Table VII, from Carter and Skiba (2012), reports the number of loans for each 
collateral category, the percentage of observations, and the average amount and 
standard deviation of the items pawned for each category. The sample of 
observations originates from a pawnshop lender in Texas between 1997 and 2002 
but can be interpreted as representative of the transactions profile of a typical 
pawnshop.34 
[TABLE VII] 
Fifty percent of pawnshop loans are collateralized with jewelry, with over half 
of jewelry consisting of rings, including both men’s and women’s class and 
wedding rings. The next most popular category of pledges is televisions and 
electronics, including satellite dishes, stereos, and CD players. Individuals also 
commonly pawn tools, household items such as small appliances, sporting 
equipment, guns, musical instruments, and camera equipment. The average loan 
amount for loans collateralized by jewels is $96, a value only lower than guns and 
musical instruments.  
What makes jewelry and, in particular, gold so important for pawnbrokers? 
Besides the fact that gold is a precious metal, the bulk of pawnbrokers’ profits 
originate from melting down the gold received by their clients through the 
“refinement” process. A refiner takes the rings, necklaces, bracelets and other 
items and melts them. Professional outfits remove impurities from the metals until 
they get something close to pure gold.35 Hence, stolen items, easily transformed 
                                                
34 Similar evidence is in fact found in Comeau et al. (2011). See also Fellowees and Mabanta (2008), 
Shackman and Tenney (2006). 
 
35 Refiners typically have minimum quantities of metals that they accept and work with. They normally 
work with several pounds of material, so direct link between clients and refiners can rarely happen. 
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into an unrecognizable bar of precious metal, can disappear forever from the 
second-hand market (Sutton, 2010), ending up in the bullion market or in similar 
places.36 This process ensures to pawnbrokers a fast and secure way to make 
profits by dealing with gold-related products. 
Supply Side  
 
Even if most thieves have an ever-changing hierarchy of items that they prefer 
to steal (Sutton, 2010), crime statistics and victim surveys describe how the most 
commonly stolen items during burglaries are cash, jewelry and consumer 
electrical equipment.37 Table A3 in the Appendix shows illustrative evidence of 
the percentage of stolen items specifically during burglaries.38  
Larcenies are instead a less gold-intensive crime category. Common types of 
larcenies include shoplifting, pocket picking, purse snatching, and theft of objects 
from motor vehicles or bicycles: thefts usually not involving jewelry. In 2010, 
only 11.3% of common larcenies targeted normal buildings, while 35% were from 
motor vehicles, 17% from shoplifting, 3% bicycles, and 31.8% all others.39 
Research Design and Identification Strategy 
The hypothesis explored in this paper is that shifts in the resale value of gold, 
while potentially increasing burglars’ expected value of committing a theft 
                                                                                                                                
Information can be found online, see: http://www.pawnnerd.com/where-do-pawn-shops-sell-their-gold-and-
silver/ or http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21591230-falling-price-gold-hurting-
pawnbroking-business-hock-and-sinker. 
36 The bullion Market is a forum through which buyers and sellers trade pure gold and silver. The bullion 
market is open 24 hours a day and is primarily an over-the-counter market. The bullion market has a high 
turnover rate and most transactions are conducted electronically or by phone. Gold and silver derive their 
value from their industrial and commercial uses; they can also act as a hedge against inflation.  
37 Similar evidence is found in Fitzgerald and Poynton (2010), Sorensen (2011) and Walters et al. (2013). 
38 Police recorded crime data are from the Sanwdwell Metropolitan Borough Council area of the West 
Midlands (Burrel and Wellsmith, 2010). 
      39  For more info: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2010/property-crime/larcenytheftmain . 
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uniformly in all counties, might cause relatively more thefts in counties with an 
higher predetermined concentration of markets potentially interested in buying 
gold products, namely pawnshops. 
These premises are the basis of the following OLS estimating equation: 
𝑦!,!,! = 𝛼!   + 𝛾! + 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! + #𝑝𝑎𝑤𝑛!,!!!""# ∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠! 𝛽! + 𝜖!,!,!                          (2) 
 
where i indicates the county, s the state and t the year. The coefficient of 
interest is 𝛽! , the effect on crime of the interaction between the initial 
concentrations of pawnshops per capita in a county, fixed to the first year of the 
sample (1997), and the gold price at time t. The geographical distribution of 
pawnshops, that resembles the differential in gold treatment-intensity across 
counties, is shown in Figure I. 
In this specification, a key role is played by the inclusion of year fixed effects, 
that partial out from the estimate the direct and uniform effect that the rise of gold 
prices might have on the growth of theft crimes in all counties.40 I also include 
county fixed effects and all the county observables included in the previous 
analysis. 
[FIGURE I] 
Gold Prices 
 
My study analyzes a period of 14 years, from 1997 to 2010. In the first 9 years 
of the sample, from 1997 to 2005, gold prices fluctuated significantly rising in 
                                                
40  The same reasoning applies to the plausible increase in burglaries reported to police due to a 
homogenous increase in the value of stolen jewelry.  
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value by about 37%. From 2006 to 2010 instead, gold prices displayed an 
impressive increase of almost 200%.41 
[FIGURE II] 
   The 2006 spike in gold prices might have led other businesses, such as jewelers 
and online refineries, to increase or to start their demand for gold, in order to 
exploit the high-profitability of this new type of commerce. To investigate the 
presence of heterogeneity in the effects, I split the sample into two periods: 1997-
2005 and 2006-2010. 
Results 
 
Table VIII reports the results of the estimating equations (2) for burglaries.  
[TABLE VIII] 
In the baseline specifications I detect a coefficient of 1.00 significant at the 10% 
level in the first part of the sample (column1) and a coefficient of 0.431 
significant at the 1% level in the second part of the sample (column 3). To put 
these results into perspective, a one standard deviation increase in the initial 
concentration of pawnshops in a county generates a 0.05 to 0.10 standard 
deviation increase in the effect of gold prices on burglaries.42  
In column 2 and 4 I also include in the specification each county observable, 
fixed at year 1997, interacted with gold prices. Specifically, I include gold prices 
interacted with: income per capita, percentage of people below the poverty line, 
                                                
41 I use as unit of measurement the price of gold in US dollars (averaged over the entire year) per troy 
ounce. Data are freely downloadable from the following website: http://www.gold.org. (Accessed date: 
December 2012) 
     42 No effect is detected for larcenies as for any other crime. Results are qualitatively similar and robust in 
both part of the sample if I use the interaction between pawnshops per capita in 1997 and the log of gold 
prices. Results are omitted only for brevity considerations.  
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percentage of unemployment, social security recipients, average monthly 
payment, commercial banks and saving institutions, amount of banking and 
saving deposits, population density and the racial/ethnic composition in the 
county (percentages of White, Black, Asian and American Indian population both 
Hispanic or not Hispanic). 
This specification attempts to control for the presence of other possible 
confounding channels through which the rise of gold prices might have affected 
the proliferation of burglaries, with different trends in different counties. It is 
reassuring to notice that the inclusion of these controls strengthen the significance 
and the magnitude of the effects on burglaries in the first part of the sample, (1.17 
significant at the 5%), while it reduces the coefficient of the period 2005-2010 to 
0.3, nevertheless still significant at the 10% level. 43, 44 
 
 
 
                                                
43 Further Robustness checks are shown in table A4 and A5 of the Appendix. In column1 I cluster standard 
errors at the state level, while in column 2 I use two-way clustering at the county/year level.  In column 3 I 
weight the regression using as weight the FBI coverage indicator. In column 4 I eliminate from the sample 
the counties in the top 1% of the pawnshops’ per capita distribution. In column 5 I eliminate from the sample 
the counties in the top 1% of the population distribution. In column 6 I add state linear trends. Results are 
robust across all specifications in the first part of the sample (1997-2005) while are more sensitive, especially 
to the inclusion of state linear trends, from 2006 to 2010. Possible econometric and economic explanations 
are discussed in footnote 44. Results in the first part of the sample are also robust to the exclusion from the 
analysis of the year 1997, hence eliminating the presence of possible reverse causality between burglaries and 
pawnshops in 1997. Results are omitted for brevity considerations only. 
44 Two possible econometric reasons that might explain the extra-sensitivity of the coefficient in the 
second part of the sample, (with respect to the more stable estimates from 1997 to 2005), are: 1) the use of 
only 5 years of data (2006-2010); 2) the stable upward trend in gold prices after 2005 that is collinear with 
the inclusion of state-linear trends. From an economic perspective instead, the decrease in the size of the 
coefficient is consistent with the possibility that other type of businesses could have entered the resale market 
for gold, (due to the increase in the potential profitability of this activity). In this case, the measure of 
pawnshops, if interpreted as a biased measure of the “true size” of the market for stolen goods, could suffer 
from a time-variant measurement error that could lead to a more severe attenuation bias in the second part of 
the sample. Other possible explanations are related to the mechanic decrease overtime of the “available gold 
to steal” in areas with a high concentration of pawnshops or to the progressive understanding by the local 
community of the involvement of these businesses in the trade of stolen jewelry.  
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Copper Thefts and the “Red Gold” Rush 
 
The concluding analysis performs an additional falsification test, exploiting 
the fact that typically pawnshops do not trade copper, as shown in Table VII, even 
if criminals heavily target objects made with this metal. 
The demand for copper from developing nations has generated an intense 
international copper trade. According to the FBI, copper thieves exploit this 
demand and the related spike in international prices by stealing and selling the 
metal to recyclers across the United States.45 Thieves target electrical sub-stations, 
cellular towers, telephone landlines, railroads, water wells, construction sites, and 
vacant homes for lucrative profits.  
Table IX displays the estimates of the interaction between copper prices and 
the initial concentration of pawnshops in the county.46 In the baseline regression 
(columns 1 and 3) I include the interaction between pawnshops in 1997 and 
copper prices while, in columns 2 and 4, I add to the baseline specification the 
interaction between pawnshops in 1997 and gold prices. 
[TABLE IX] 
 In the first part of the sample (1997-2005) I detect a positive but imprecisely 
estimated effect of copper prices through the pawnshops channel. Nevertheless, 
this effect vanishes when I include the interaction between gold prices and 
pawnshops (column 2). It is reassuring to observe that, despite the presence of 
high collinearity between the two-interaction terms, (due to a 0.84 correlation 
between gold and copper prices), pawnshops seem to affect burglaries uniquely 
through the gold channel. Moreover, from 2006 to 2010 the copper-interaction 
                                                
45 See: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/december/copper_120308  
46 Data on historical copper price is obtained from the U.S. geological survey at: http://www.usgs.gov/ 
(Accessed date: December 2012) 
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term is negative and significant at the 1% level in both specifications, while the 
gold-interaction term is 0.34, significant at the 5% level. 
While I do not want to overemphasize the negative impact that the initial 
concentration of pawnshops has on burglaries through copper prices, I consider 
the substitutability across markets for stolen goods, due to oscillation in world 
prices, an extremely interesting venue for future research. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This paper offers one of the first systematic empirical investigations of the 
effect of stolen goods markets on criminal behavior. Motivated by the richness of 
anecdotal evidence, I look at this issue through the lens of pawnshops, a business 
that has long being suspected of being involved in illicit trade. I address the 
endogeneity of pawnshops to crime in multiple ways.  
I first exploit the panel properties of the dataset constructed for the analysis. 
Results confirm that the concentration of pawnshops in a county is a strong and 
significant predictor of larcenies and burglaries. The findings are robust to 
extensive robustness and falsification checks. I also detect the presence of 
geographical spillover effects on crime and heterogeneity of the effects related to 
the population density. 
I then exploit an exogenous shift in crimes’ expected benefits using the rise in 
gold prices as a quasi-natural experiment, where the intensity of the treatment is 
given by the initial concentration of pawnshops in the county. Results still 
confirm the hypothesis that pawnshops strengthen the expected benefits deriving 
from illegal activity, amplifying the effect that the rise in gold prices has on the 
proliferation of burglaries.  
This paper suggests new directions for future research. A direct spin off of this 
work would be the analysis of other markets for stolen goods, such as flea 
 33 
markets, junkyards or online web sites such as EBay or Craigslist. Moreover, 
entering the “black box” of the mechanism that links demand and supply of crime 
is critical for the understanding of criminal behavior. Two mechanisms might in 
fact play an important role in this context. On the one hand, the increase in the 
size of stolen goods’ markets might increase crime by reducing the criminal 
expected probability of being arrested (negative deterrence effect). On the other 
hand, the increase in the level of competition in the resale market might push up 
prices, raising the expected resale value of the stolen item (price effect). 
Disentangling these two channels might help to shape specific policy 
interventions that seek to reduce the impact that the proliferation of stolen goods 
markets can have on criminal behavior.  
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TABLE I - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (PAWNSHOPS AND CRIMES) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
    
Pawnshops 
 
28,430 5.88 6.32 
Larcenies 28,430 1,840 1,046 
Burglaries 28,430 654.2 394.7 
Robberies 28,430 52.74 73.96 
Motor/Vehicle Thefts 28,430 190.4 180.0 
Murders 28,430 3.86 5.43 
Rapes 28,430 27.28 22.44 
Assaults 28,430 237.2 203.2 
Arsons 28,430 18.13 20.81 
Notes: Variables standardized per 100.000 people, by county. Source NACJD, 1997-2010. 
 
 
 
TABLE II A – POOLED MEASURE OF THEFT-RELATED CRIMES 
 (1) 
Baseline 
(2) 
+ County FE 
(3) 
+ County Time-
Varying 
Observables 
    
    
Pawnshops per Capita 26.85*** 6.475*** 6.124*** 
 (6.776) (2.134) (2.177) 
    
Observations 28,430 28,430 27,466 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.850 0.855 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
STATE TRENDS YES YES YES 
COUNTY FE NO YES YES 
County Observables NO NO YES 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
Pawnshops and reported crimes are in per capita terms. The pooled measure of theft-related crimes 
is constructed as the sum of larcenies, robberies, burglaries and motor–vehicle thefts. County 
observables include percentages of Whites Hispanics, Whites not Hispanics, Blacks Hispanics, 
Blacks not Hispanics, Asians Hispanics, Asians not Hispanics, American Indians Hispanics, 
American Indians not Hispanics, income per capita, percentage of people below the poverty line, 
unemployment, social security recipients, average monthly payment per subsidy, commercial banks 
and saving institutions per capita, amount of banking and saving deposits, population density. 
Column 1 shows the baseline specification with year FE and state linear trends. In column 2 I add 
county FE, in column 3 I include all county observables.  
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TABLE II B – POOLED MEASURE OF NON-THEFT CRIMES 
 (1) 
Baseline 
(2) 
+ County FE 
(3) 
+ County Time-
Varying 
Observables 
    
    
Pawnshops per Capita 2.440*** 0.00386 0.0629 
 (0.626) (0.493) (0.498) 
    
Observations 28,430 28,430 27,466 
Adjusted R-squared 0.310 0.724 0.737 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
STATE TRENDS YES YES YES 
COUNTY FE NO YES YES 
County Observables NO NO YES 
Potential Confounding Controls NO NO NO 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
Pawnshops and reported crimes are in per capita terms. The pooled measure of other crimes is 
constructed as the sum of murders, rapes, aggravated assaults and arsons. County observables 
include percentages of Whites Hispanics, Whites not Hispanics, Blacks Hispanics, Blacks not 
Hispanics, Asians Hispanics, Asians not Hispanics, American Indians Hispanics, American Indians 
not Hispanics, income per capita, percentage of people below the poverty line, unemployment, 
social security recipients, average monthly payment per subsidy, commercial banks and saving 
institutions per capita, amount of banking and saving deposits, population density. Column 1 shows 
the baseline specification with year FE and state linear trends. In column 2 I add county FE, in 
column 3 I include all county observables. 
 
 
TABLE III A - THEFT-CRIMES: BREAKDOWN BY TYPE OF CRIME 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larcenies Burglaries Robberies Motor-Vehicle 
tThefts      
Pawnshops per Capita 4.601*** 1.507** -0.0212 0.0377 
 (1.683) (0.655) (0.0580) (0.173) 
     
Observations 27,466 27,466 27,466 27,466 
Adjusted R-squared 0.841 0.795 0.916 0.845 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
State Trends YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
Pawnshops and reported crimes are in per capita terms. The table shows the results from 4 different 
regressions, one for each type of reported theft-crime: larceny, burglary, robbery and motor vehicle 
theft. All the specifications include county FE, year FE, state trends and county observables. 
County observables include percentages of: Whites Hispanics, Whites not Hispanics, Blacks 
Hispanics, Blacks not Hispanics, Asians Hispanics, Asians not Hispanics, American Indians 
Hispanics, American Indians not Hispanics, income per capita, percentage of people below the 
poverty line, unemployment, social security recipients, the average monthly payment per subsidy, 
commercial banks and saving institutions per capita, the amount of banking and saving deposits 
and population density.  
 36 
 
 
TABLE III B – NON-THEFT CRIMES: BREAKDOWN BY TYPE OF CRIME 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Murders Rapes Assaults Arsons 
     
Pawnshops per Capita 0.0165 0.0236 -0.0322 0.0550 
 (0.0196) (0.0525) (0.473) (0.0427) 
     
Observations 27,466 27,466 27,466 27,466 
Adjusted R-squared 0.285 0.541 0.727 0.510 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
State Trends YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
Pawnshops and reported crimes are in per capita terms. The table shows the results from 4 different 
regressions, one for each type of reported NON theft-crime: murder, rape, assault and arson. All the 
specifications include county FE, year FE, state trends and county observables. County observables 
include percentages of: Whites Hispanics, Whites not Hispanics, Blacks Hispanics, Blacks not 
Hispanics, Asians Hispanics, Asians not Hispanics, American Indians Hispanics, American Indians 
not Hispanics, income per capita, percentage of people below the poverty line, unemployment, 
social security recipients, the average monthly payment per subsidy, commercial banks and saving 
institutions per capita, the amount of banking and saving deposits and population density. 
 
 
TABLE IV - ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: LARCENY & BURGLARY 
 (1) 
State-Level 
Clustering 
(2) 
Two-Way 
Clustering 
(County-
Year) 
(3) 
Weighted 
Regression 
(FBI 
Coverage) 
(4) 
Trimming 
Top 1% 
Pawnshops 
(5) 
Trimming 
Top 1% 
Population 
   
 
   
(1) Pawnshops per Capita 4.601** 4.601*** 4.414*** 4.976*** 4.563*** 
 (2.153) (1.611) (1.569) (1.771) (1.689) 
 
      
(2) Pawnshops per Capita 1.507** 1.507** 1.467** 1.591** 1.504** 
 (0.670) (0.741) (0.632) (0.682) (0.655) 
 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
State Trends YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table shows the robustness checks for larceny (row 1) 
and burglary (row 2). Pawnshops and reported crimes are in per capita terms. Column 1 shows the 
results when I cluster standard errors at the state level, while in column 2 I cluster at the 
county/year level.  In column 3 I perform a weighted regression using as weight the FBI coverage 
indicator, a measure of the precision of the information related to reported crimes (see footnote 34 
for more information). In column 4 I eliminate from the sample the counties in the top 1% of the 
pawnshops’ per capita distribution. In column 5 I eliminate from the sample the counties in the top 
1% of the population distribution. 
 37 
 
 
TABLE V – SUB GROUPS ANALYSIS: POPULATION DENSITY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larcenies 
         Low                      High 
Burglaries 
         Low                      High 
     
Pawnshops per Capita 3.321* 10.97*** 1.289* 2.906** 
 (1.968) (3.774) (0.750) (1.374) 
     
Observations 13,788 13,678 13,788 13,678 
Adjusted R-squared 0.800 0.845 0.717 0.849 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
State Trends YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the county level. Pawnshops 
and reported crimes are in per capita terms. Column 1 and 2 show the results for larcenies, while 
column 3 and 4 show the results for burglaries. The sample is divided in counties below and above 
the median population density (Low and High, respectively). Percentiles are computed with respect 
to the density of the county, averaged for each county in the 14 years of the sample (1997 - 2010). 
All the specifications include all the fixed effects used in the analysis and all county observables. 
 
 
TABLE VI – GEOGRAPHICAL SPILLOVER ANALYSIS – PAWNSHOPS IN OTHER 
COUNTIES WITHIN THE STATE 
 (1) (2) 
 Larcenies Burglaries 
   
Pawnshops in the County 4.561*** 1.482** 
 (1.687) 
 
(0.656) 
Pawnshops in the State 22.59* 14.01*** 
 (12.11) (4.352) 
   
Observations 27,464 27,464 
Adjusted R-squared 0.841 0.795 
Year FE YES YES 
State Trends YES YES 
County FE YES YES 
County Observables YES YES 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
Pawnshops and reported crimes are in per capita terms. In each regression we include: the number 
of pawnshops per capita in the county where crime is measured (first row) and the number of 
pawnshops per capita in all the other counties within the same state. In computing the latter I 
exclude from the numerator the number of pawnshops in the county where crime is measured and 
from the denominator the population of the county where crime is measured. 
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TABLE VII - COLLATERAL BY CATEGORY (CARTER AND SKIBA, 2012) 
Category Observations Relative % Average Loan 
Standard 
Deviation 
     Jewelry 199,288 49.98% $96.28 105.02 
TVs/Electronics 126,297 31.68% $58.80 62.34 
Tools/Equipment 31,600 7.93% $50.18 60.67 
Household Items 10552 2.65% $42.92 44.7 
Missing 7,833 1.96% $63.75 72.54 
Guns 7,734 1.94% $146.97 98.75 
Instruments 7,700 1.93% $116.92 104.66 
Camera/Equipment 4,052 1.02% $75.85 77.87 
Miscellaneous 3,666 0.92% $51.50 62.46 
Note: This table reports the number of loans for each collateral category, the percentage of 
observations, and the average amount and standard deviation of the items pawned for each 
category. All amounts are in 2002 US dollars. The sample of observations is from a pawnshop 
lender in Texas between 1997 and 2002, (Carter and Skiba, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
TABLE VIII – BURGLARIES’ RESPONSES TO GOLD PRICES 
  
  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1997-2005                   2006-2010  Baseline  +Controls*Gold 
Prices 
Baseline  +Controls*Gold 
Prices       Pawnshops(t=1997)*Gold  
Prices 
1.000* 1.173** 0.431*** 0.306* 
 (0.525) (0.572) (0.151) (0.161) 
      Observations 17,195 17,195 10,271 10,271 
Adjusted R-squared 0.809 0.81 0.863 0.865 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Controls*Gold Prices NO YES NO YES 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Pawnshops and 
reported crimes are in per capita terms. This table shows the results for the interaction between pawnshops per 
capita in a county, fixed to the first year of the sample (1997), and gold prices. I split the sample in two periods: 
1997-2005 (columns 1 and 2) and 2006-2010 (columns 3 and 4). Year FE, county FE and all county 
observables are included in all specifications. In columns 2 and 4 I add the interaction between all county 
observables fixed at the first year of the sample and gold prices. I include the interaction of gold prices with: 
percentages of Whites Hispanics, Whites not Hispanics, Blacks Hispanics, Blacks not Hispanics, Asians 
Hispanics, Asians not Hispanics, American Indians Hispanics, American Indians not Hispanics, income per 
capita, percentage of people below the poverty line, unemployment, social security recipients, average monthly 
payment per subsidy, commercial banks and saving institutions per capita, amount of banking and saving 
deposits, population density. 
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TABLE IX - FALSIFICATION TESTS: COPPER PRICES  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1997-2005 
     Baseline               + Pawnshops 
                                      * Gold 
2006-2010 
   Baseline                 +Pawnshops 
                                     * Gold 
     
Pawnshops (t=1997)*Gold  1.267  0.344** 
  (0.936) 
 
 (0.147) 
Pawnshops (t=1997)*Copper 0.802 -0.334 -2.004*** -1.820*** 
 (0.516) (0.912) (0.437) (0.418) 
     
Observations 17,195 17,195 10,271 10,271 
Adjusted R-squared 0.809 0.809 0.863 0.864 
County FE 
Year FE 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Burglary 
is the dependent variable. In column 1 and 2 I show the results for the first part of the sample 
(1997-2005) while in column 3 and 4 I show the results for the second part of the sample (2006-
2010). In the baseline specification I estimate the interaction between copper prices and pawnshops 
per capita in the county, fixed in 1997. In Columns 2 and 4 I add to the baseline specification the 
interaction between gold prices and pawnshops per capita in the county, fixed at 1997. 
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Figure 1: Pawnshops in the United States 
 
 
Notes: Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of pawnshops in the United States for the year 1997. 
In this figure, I show the pawnshops distribution by deciles computed using the normalized measure of 
pawnshops per 100,000 inhabitants. Alaska and Hawaii are eliminated from the map for illustrative purposes 
only. 
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Figure 2: Gold Prices 1997 - 2010 
 
Notes: Figure II shows the evolution of gold prices, from 1997 to 2010. I use as unit of measurement the 
normalized price of gold in US dollars, averaged over the entire year per troy ounce. The left-hand side figure 
shows the gold prices dynamic in levels, while the right-hand figure shows the gold prices evolution 
expressed as percentage changes from t-1. After 2005, the percentage annual increase is always above 10% 
with a pick of 37% increase in 2006 with respect to 2005. 
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VI. Appendix  
Crimes Definition: 
 
1. Murder (criminal homicide): The willful (non negligent) killing of one hum 
an being by another.  
2. Forcible rape: The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her 
will. 
3. Robbery: The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, 
custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or 
violence and/or by putting the victim in fear. 
4. Aggravated assault: An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the 
purpose of in inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of 
assault usually is accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to 
produce death or great bodily harm. 
5. Burglary: The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft.  
6. Larceny: The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of property 
from the possession or constructive possession of another. Common types 
of larcenies include shoplifting, pocket picking, purse snatching, theft of 
objects from motor vehicles, theft of bicycles and theft of items from 
buildings in which the offender has legal access.  
7. Motor vehicle theft: The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle.  
8. Arson: any willful or malicious burning or attempting to burn, with or 
without intent to defraud, a dwelling house, public building, motor vehicle 
or aircraft, personal property of another, etc. 
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Hierarchy Rule 
In some cases, a single incident may have consisted of two distinct offenses. For 
example, during the course of a robbery, a victim may have been fatally shot. In 
cases in which multiple offenses are committed by the same offender against the 
same victim during a given felonious act, the hierarchy rule is employed to 
determine how the crime is classified. A crime is classified according to the most 
serious offense committed. Importantly, the hierarchy rule does not apply to the 
offense of arson. In fact, when arson is involved in a multiple offense situation, 
the reporting agency must report two part I offenses, the arson as well as the 
additional part I offense. The preceding list is ranked according to the hierarchy 
rule. 
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TABLE A1- DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS COUNTY OBSERVABLES 
 (1) (2) 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
   
% White – Not Hispanic 0.79 0.18 
% White – Hispanic 0.06 0.12 
% Black – Hispanic 0.00 0.00 
% Black – Not Hispanic 0.10 0.14 
% Asian – Hispanic 0.01 0.02 
% Asian – Not Hispanic 0.0 0.00 
% American Indian – Hispanic 0.00 0.0 
% American Indian – Not Hispanic 0.01 0.06 
% Unemployment 6.0 2.7 
Income per capita 27,365 7,852 
People below the poverty line 16,278 53,982 
Number of banks and savings institutions 39.82 17.73 
Poverty standardized 0.146 0.06 
Social Security recipients 20,488 47,166 
Density 
Social security average monthly payment 
318.5 
411.2 
2,019 
75.6 
   
Notes: Source US Census Bureau, 1997-2010 
 
 
TABLE A2 – ROBUSTNESS TO THE INCLUSION OF COUNTY TRENDS 
 (1) (2) 
 Larcenies Burglaries 
   
Pawnshops 2.341* 0.801 
 (1.246) (0.581) 
   
Observations 27,466 27,466 
Adjusted R-squared 0.887 0.845 
Year FE YES YES 
County Trends YES YES 
County FE YES YES 
County Observables YES YES 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the standard errors are clustered at the county level. This table 
shows the results for larcenies and burglaries when county-linear trends are included. I also include 
county fixed effects, year fixed effects and all county observables. Pawnshops and reported crimes 
are in per capita terms. All the specifications include county FE, year FE, state trends and county 
observables. County observables include percentages of: Whites Hispanics, Whites not Hispanics, 
Blacks Hispanics, Blacks not Hispanics, Asians Hispanics, Asians not Hispanics, American Indians 
Hispanics, American Indians not Hispanics, income per capita, percentage of people below the 
poverty line, unemployment, social security recipients, the average monthly payment per subsidy, 
commercial banks and saving institutions per capita, the amount of banking and saving deposits 
and population density. 
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Table A3- Items stolen during burglaries - (Burrel and Wellsmith, 2010) 
  Cash 40% 
 
Documents 5% 
Jewelry 31% 
 
Ornaments 5% 
Audio 25% 
 
Food 5% 
VCR 17% 
 
Tools 5% 
TV 17% 
 
Furniture 3% 
Personal 12% 
 
Cigarettes 3% 
Telecom 12% 
 
Vehicles 2% 
Computer 11% 
 
Cycle 2% 
Photographic 11% 
 
DVD 2% 
Games 10% 
 
Building 1% 
Purse 10% 
 
Garden 1% 
Cards 10% 
 
Digital 0% 
Luggage 9% 
 
Sports 0% 
Clothing 9% 
 
Antiques 0% 
Domestic  7% 
   Keys 6% 
   
Notes: This table shows the percentage of the stolen items during burglaries. Police recorded crime 
data are from the Sanwdwell Metropolitan Borough Council area of the West Midlands. The period 
covered is from 1997 to 2003. Percentage do not sum to 100 due to the stealing of multiple 
categories. 
 
TABLE A4 – BURGLARIES’ RESPONSE TO GOLD PRICES, ROBUSTNESS 1997-2005 
 (1) 
State level  
Clustering 
(2) 
Two-Way 
Clustering 
(3) 
Weighted 
Regression: 
FBI 
Coverage 
(4) 
Trimming: 
Top 1% 
Pawnshops 
(5) 
Trimming: 
Top 1% 
Population 
(6) 
+State 
Linear 
Trends 
       
Pawnshops (t=1997)*Gold 1.173* 1.173* 1.216** 1.398** 1.182** 1.13** 
 (0.631) (0.701) (0.573) (0.655) (0.573) (0.60) 
       
Observations 17,195 17,195 17,195 17,021 17,020 17,195 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls*Gold Prices YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This Table shows the robustness checks for the 
specification where I include the interaction term between pawnshops per capita in 1997 and gold 
prices. In this table I focus on the first part of the sample, from 1997 to 2005. Column 1 shows the 
results when I cluster at the state level, while in column 2 I use two-way clustering at the 
county/year level.  In column 3 I perform a weighted regression using as weight the FBI coverage 
indicator. In column 4 I eliminate from the sample the counties in the top 1% of the pawnshops’ per 
capita distribution. In column 5 I eliminate from the sample the counties in the top 1% of the 
population distribution. In column 6 I add state linear trends. 
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TABLE A5 – BURGLARIES’ RESPONSE TO GOLD PRICES, ROBUSTNESS 2006-2010 
 (1) 
State level  
Clustering 
(2) 
Two-Way 
Clustering 
(3) 
Weighted 
Regression: 
FBI 
Coverage 
(4) 
Trimming: 
Top 1% 
Pawnshops 
(5)      
Trimming: 
Top 1% 
Population 
(6)      
+ State 
Linear 
Trends 
       
Pawnshops (t=1997)*Gold 0.306 0.306 0.295* 0.265 0.302* 0.11 
 (0.197) (0.198) (0.153) (0.186) (0.162) (0.17) 
       
Observations 10,271 10,271 10,271 10,163 10,163 10,271 
Adjusted R-squared 0.810 -0.060 0.816 0.810 0.809 0.809 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls*Gold Prices YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This Table shows the robustness checks for the 
specification where I include the interaction term between pawnshops per capita in 1997 and gold 
prices. In this table I focus on the second part of the sample, from 2006 to 2010. Column 1 shows 
the results when I cluster at the state level, while in column 2 I use two way clustering at the 
county/year level.  In column 3 I perform a weighted regression using as weight the FBI coverage 
indicator. In column 4 I eliminate from the sample the counties in the top 1% of the pawnshops’ per 
capita distribution. In column 5 I eliminate from the sample the counties in the top 1% of the 
population distribution. In column 6 I add state linear trends. 
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   Chapter III – Drugs and Crime in the US: Evidence from OTC Regulations 
Targeting Crystal- Meth Precursors Chemicals 
                                               By ROCCO D’ESTE * 
This chapter investigates the effects of crystal methamphetamines markets on crime. I 
use as a source of identifying variation Over-the-Counter (OTC) restrictions to meth’s 
critical inputs of production. Heavy crystal-meth addicts typically produce this substance 
in clandestine “home-labs”. Several quasi-experimental designs are performed on a 
newly assembled panel dataset. This unveils the interlinkages between drugs and criminal 
activity, combining Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) and FBI county-level information. 
A difference-in differences (DD) design shows that OTC restrictions led to a decline of 
5% to 10% in both property and violent crimes. The effects of OTC restrictions are 
stronger (i.e. more negative) in rural counties where meth production and abuse typically 
takes place. This chapter contains robustness checks and placebo tests. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The market for illegal drugs – in its main components of production, 
distribution and consumption – generates an annual social cost for the United 
States estimated around $200 billion. This value reflects lost productivity, 
environmental destruction, healthcare expenditures, and criminal activity 
(ONDCP, 2007). This paper focuses on the drugs-crime nexus, utterly pervasive 
in the United States of America. Almost 50% of all US prisoners are in fact 
clinically addicted to marijuana, crack cocaine, powdered cocaine, heroin, or 
crystal meth (NACDD, 2014). 
It is worth considering that the expansion of illegal drugs markets can 
exacerbate criminal activity via three major channels: economic, related to users’ 
need to support drug-habits or to their inability to work, typically resulting in the 
proliferation of theft crimes; pharmacological, associated with the psychosis 
arising with immediate or chronic drugs’ effects, leading to any form of physical 
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and sexual violence; and systemic, connected with the production and trafficking 
of the drug itself, exemplified by gangs’ violence in the streets to gain control 
over the territory (Goldstein, 1985).  
More indirectly, the relocation of police effort and public resources – aimed at 
containing the growth of this dangerous market – might generate unintended 
consequences. These arise if criminals specialize in different illegal activities 
characterized by lower probability of detection, or if detrimental peer effects in 
severely overcrowded prisons influence inmates’ likelihood of reoffending (FBI, 
2010). 
Recognizing and quantifying these effects is a key factor to implement cost-
effective policies. Well-shaped interventions might in fact target the expansion of 
these dangerous markets, while reducing the associated level of criminal activity. 
However, assessing the existence, empirical relevance and direction of causality 
of these effects has proven difficult.  
Two main obstacles have hindered such analysis. First, markets for illegal 
drugs are not randomly assigned. These are rather endogenously located, 
following existing economics trends or cross-sectional area characteristics. 
Second, these markets – in their major components of production, distribution and 
consumption – are difficult to measure, mainly because of their intrinsic 
concealed nature.  
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of crime. I focus on 
crystal methamphetamine, a highly addictive, neurotoxic synthetic substance. 
Local law-enforcement agencies consider it to be one of the most dangerous illicit 
drugs in the United States, due to its asserted role in generating thefts, violence 
and sex offenses. These crimes are typically perpetrated by extreme abusers when 
“under the influence” of this powerful substance (NACO, 2005).  
To address endogeneity issues, I use as a source of identifying variation a 
shock to domestic production. This is triggered by the enactment of policy 
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interventions restricting the access to methamphetamines’ critical chemical inputs 
of production: ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. These chemicals were contained in 
cold-medicines that – prior to these restrictions – were easy to obtain from 
pharmacies and local shops. These chemicals were used, together with legal 
products readily available to the public, to synthesize methamphetamines in 
clandestine “home-labs”.  
Extreme methamphetamine abusers typically ran these labs, mainly to sustain 
their drug habit and those of their close network of acquaintances (DEA, 2010). In 
practice, policy interventions studied in this paper exogenously reduced crystal-
meth exposure to potentially dangerous extreme methamphetamine’s users (i.e. 
“meth-heads”).  
The effect on crime is ex-ante ambiguous. On the one end, these policies could 
have led to an upsurge of appropriative and violent crimes. These might have 
been committed by extreme drug-addicts to offset the implicitly higher costs of 
addiction. On the other end, OTC restrictions could have pushed extreme abusers 
to decrease the intensive margin of consumption or to quit. This might have 
reduced crime committed to sustain the habit or “under the influence”. 
I primarily design the empirical analysis to investigate the effects of these 
laws. I implement several quasi-random empirical designs on a newly assembled 
county-level panel dataset. Most importantly, this dataset provides an exclusive 
look at the interconnections between markets for illegal drugs and criminal 
activity. It combines DEA detailed information on location and number of 
clandestine meth-labs, prices and purity of methamphetamines and other illegal 
substances, with FBI data on property and violent crimes, circumstances 
surrounding homicides, arrests for possession and sale of a variety of drugs. I also 
use data on hospitalizations from abuse of several typologies of illegal drugs as 
well as a wide set of socio-economic controls. These are obtained from a variety 
of sources.  
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First, I investigate the direct effects of OTC restrictions on criminal activity. I 
use a reduced-form DD design. I compare differences in crime between counties 
belonging to: i) states implementing OTC regulations in 2005 and ii) states that 
did not adopt any OTC restrictions (before and after the implementation of these 
interventions).  
Significant differences in the diffusion of distinct typologies of illegal drugs 
(such as crystal-meth, heroin, crack or powdered cocaine) provide a rationale to 
the endogenous implementation of “anti-meth” laws, only in some US states. 
Nevertheless, the validity of a DD design relies on the critical identifying 
assumption of conditional parallel trends. I explore the merits of this assumption 
in a graphical analysis. I show reassuring pre-trends for both property and violent 
crimes. I also observe a sharp decline in criminal activity post regulation, 
concentrated in treated states. 
The empirical analysis reveals a significant reduction of 5% to 10% in 
burglaries, larcenies, aggravated assaults and murders. The estimates are robust in 
the event-study analysis, with the inclusion of i) county FE, ii) a wide range of 
socio-economic controls, iii) state-specific linear and quadratic trends, the 
weighting of the regressions by a measure of the quality of the information on 
reported crimes, different functional forms, and estimation techniques. I also 
perform placebo tests on Internet and “white-collar” financial crimes. As 
expected, I do not detect any effects on crimes plausibly unrelated to the 
proliferation of this neurotoxic substance.  
Two distinct triple-differences designs strengthen the findings of this paper. 
OTC restrictions reduced significantly more criminal activity in treated rural 
counties. This is where crystal methamphetamines’ production and heavy abuse 
typically takes place (DEA, 2010). 
I then devote the central part of the paper (presented in chapter 4 of this thesis) 
exploring potential mechanisms. First, I include in the analysis DEA data on 
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clandestine meth-labs seized by law enforcement agencies. I detect a 38% 
decrease following OTC restrictions, mainly driven by small-medium capacity 
meth-labs. These estimates – arguably – represent a lower bound of the real 
reduction in the number of operating labs (Dobkin et. al, 2014). This evidence 
strengthens the hypothesis that the reduction in crime is strongly associated with 
the disruption of the domestic market for crystal meth. 
Second, I investigate the drugs-violence link. I analyze county-level data 
encompassing the detailed circumstances under which homicides occurred. The 
analysis does not reveal any effects on murders associated with police shootouts 
or gangs related killings. Hence, I do not detect any effect on the systemic 
violence, which is typically connected to the production and/or distribution of 
“more professional” illegal drugs markets. Conversely, I estimate a significant 8% 
drop in homicides associated with episodes of violent altercations. These might be 
more related to the psychotic (medically proven) violent effects arising when 
users are under the influence of crystal-meth (McKetin et al., 2014).  
Third, I examine the presence of unintended consequences of OTC restrictions. 
The lack of any effect on arrests for sales or possession of marijuana, cocaine and 
heroine – while serving the purpose of being a well-suited falsification for this 
analysis – suggests that the market for drugs did not significantly shift towards the 
trafficking or the demand of other illicit substances. Moreover, a spatial analysis 
concentrated on control counties sharing the borders with treated states does not 
reveal any geographical relocation of meth-production or criminal activity. 
Therefore, based on: i) the exploration of the underlying mechanisms, ii) 
additional descriptive evidence from FBI and DEA, iii) ethnographies studying 
the behavior of heavy meth-addicts, I propose a simple theoretical dynamic-
framework. This framework guides and sharpens the interpretation of the 
findings.  
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The set-up of the model matches qualitative features of the domestic market of 
crystal methamphetamines. I focus on the decision process of a typical drug-
addict, who needs to commit crime to sustain his habit. I model the introduction 
of OTC restrictions as an unexpected shock to crystal meth prices:  intense users 
developed their addiction before the policy intervention, when they had “low-
cost” access to crystal meth. This is either because they were small producers, or 
because the substance was manufactured within their close network of 
acquaintances, sharing the same habit. 
The model, while acknowledging the potential ambiguous effect of change in 
meth-prices on criminal behavior, provides an additional set of testable 
implications. These are corroborated by the subsequent empirical analysis or by 
further descriptive/qualitative evidence.  
Testable Implication 1 predicts that OTC restrictions should lead to a 
monotonic reduction in the use of methamphetamines. I investigate this 
hypothesis using: 1)  “Monitoring the Future”, an ongoing study of the behaviors, 
attitudes, and values of American secondary school students, college students, and 
young adults and 2) Quest Diagnostics, the major providers of illegal drugs 
testing in the United States.  
These two separate sources descriptively confirm Testable Implication 1. In 
both cases, official documentation shows a national a drop in crystal-
methamphetamines lifetime prevalence of almost 30% from 2004 to 2005 among 
12 graders, and a reduction of 15.2% and 35.7% (in 2005 and 2006, with respect 
to 2004) for workplace positive tests due to crystal meth. The drop in the abuse of 
the substance is also confirmed by numerous ethnographies describing the impact 
of OTC restrictions on the lives of extreme meth addicts (Sexton et al. 2008, 
Lopez, 2014). 
This evidence leads to Testable Implication 2: OTC restrictions, by decreasing 
the intensive/extensive margin of consumption of extreme-abusers, should have 
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led to an increase in “cold turkey” episodes, meth-hospitalizations due to 
rehabilitation, detoxification and withdrawal symptoms. I formally test this 
hypothesis using the Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS). This database contains 
drugs-specifics information of the episodes of voluntary public hospitalizations 
for detoxification, rehabilitation and ambulatory.  
The DD analysis reveals an increase of 34% for the case of hospitalizations 
associated with methamphetamines’ addiction, significant at the 5% level. 
Convincingly, this effect is isolated only to the case of crystal methamphetamines. 
No effect is detected on hospitalizations due to abuse of alcohol or several other 
illegal substances such as crack-cocaine, heroin, marijuana and LSD.  
Testable Implication 3 predicts the presence of potential heterogeneous and 
non-monotonic effects of the laws on criminal activity across US states. As a 
partial confirmation of this prediction, the analysis suggests that some US state 
experienced an increase in crime after OTC restrictions. Despite the difficulty to 
provide a more profound rationale to this differential impact, the analysis 
indicates that the reduction in crime has been stronger (i.e. more negative) in 
states with higher pre-determined prevalence of methamphetamine users.  
Overall, the findings – alongside the evidence gathered from medical, 
ethnographic and practitioners’ sources – support the hypothesis that OTC 
restrictions put a cap on “meth-epidemic”. This seems to have played a major role 
in slowing-down the spiral of heavy drugs’ abuse and associated criminal 
behavior, soaring “under the influence” of this powerful substance. This work 
ultimately suggests that embedding the criminogenic effects of illegal drugs’ 
abuse within the cost-benefit analysis developed in Becker (1968), might provide 
a richer framework through which analyzing criminal behavior’s production 
function. 
From a policy perspective, this paper emphasizes the benefits of supply-side 
interventions leading to a short-term reduction in criminal activity. Nevertheless, 
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it also highlights the importance of taking into account the demand-side of the 
market, with a focus on communities where the abuse of the illegal substance is 
extremely acute.  
More broadly, while the exploration of the mechanisms leading to presumed 
heterogeneous and non-monotonic effects of anti-drugs laws on crime is beyond 
the scope of this work, this paper suggests two additional aspects worth exploring. 
First, it is important to carefully consider the psychotic effects specific to each 
“hard-drug”. These could plausibly lead to stronger criminogenic effects either 
when users are “under the influence” (e.g. stimulants such as crack cocaine, 
amphetamines and bath salts) or – conversely – when they are “on withdrawal” 
(e.g. narcotics such as opium, morphine and heroin). Second, a key role could be 
played the presence of possible non-linearity in the elasticity of demand. This 
might generate differential effects on criminal activity within different price-
range.47 In my view, these and other interesting aspects provides fertile ground for 
the emergence of both new theoretical and empirical research. 
This paper unfolds as follows: section II describes the related literature; section 
III provides the institutional background; section IV presents the data sources and 
the main empirical design; section V reports related-results, robustness checks 
and placebo exercises; chapter 4 explores the underlying mechanisms, it also 
presents the theoretical framework, the set of testable implications and the 
subsequent empirical analysis. Chapter 5 presents an instrumental variable 
approach, designed to address the endogenous opening of meth-labs and to detect 
its direct effects on crime. This chapter also presents an additional DD design 
exploiting the subsequent CMEA federal act, and the examination of the long-run 
effects of OTC restrictions. 
                                                
 
     47 Two recent studies on elasticity of demand for illegal drugs are: Olmstead et al. (2015) and Gallet 
(2014). 
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II. Related Literature 
My findings contribute to several strands of the literature. To the extent of my 
knowledge, this is the first study that credibly overcomes simultaneity issues 
typically linking drug’s abuse and criminal propensity. I achieve this by 
exploiting OTC policies restricting the access to crystal meth chemical precursors, 
performed in clandestine labs. Extreme methamphetamine abusers typically ran 
these operations, mainly to sustain their drug habit and those of their close 
network of acquaintances (DEA, 2010). In practice, these changes in policy allow 
for the exploration of the effects of an exogenous change in illegal drug exposure 
on criminal activity.48  
My study is also closely related to a recent literature that focuses on how 
drugs-policy intervention affects crime. Melissa Dell (2014) uses a regression 
discontinuity design to show that drug-related violence increases substantially 
after close elections of National Action Party (PAN) mayors. Her findings suggest 
that this violence is caused by rival traffickers' attempts to usurp territories after 
police crackdowns. This was linked to PAN aggressive policy that weakened 
incumbent criminals. Adda, Mcconnel and Rasul (2014) show that cannabis 
depenalization policy in the London borough of Lambeth caused police to 
reallocate effort toward non-drug crime. This led to a significant reduction of all 
these types of felonies. 
This paper complements two other works on methamphetamines market. 
Dobkin and Nicosia (2009) estimates the effects of a different government effort 
                                                
48One of the first pioneering analyses in this area, Corman and Mocan (2000) show that drug usage in New 
York City has only a small effect on some property crimes. Nevertheless, the exclusive focus on the time 
series dimension coupled with the absence of a clean identification strategy might represent a potential limit 
of this work. Along these lines is the work of De Mello (2011). He investigates the effects on crime of crack-
cocaine arrests in Sao Paolo using a fixed-effects framework. His empirical exercise, which relies on within 
province changes in the proportion of crack-cocaine arrests, show that these explains 30% of the time series 
variation in the homicides in the state of Sao Paolo. 
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aimed at reducing the supply of this substance in California in the year 1995.49 
They show that when methamphetamine price tripled, purity declined from 90 
percent to 20 percent, amphetamine related hospital and treatment admissions 
dropped 50 percent and 35 percent. They do not find substantial reductions in 
property or violent crime. Dobkin, Nicosia and Weinberg (2014), focus on the 
OTC regulations that I investigate. They use various rich administrative datasets 
and mainly focus on methamphetamines’ market. Consistent with my results, they 
detect a 36% decrease in meth-labs seized by police. My study benefits from the 
richness of their administrative information to get important insights about this 
market. Importantly, I look at the effects of OTC restrictions from a different 
angle. In fact, I focus on unveiling the impact of crystal methamphetamines on 
crime, and identifying the underlying operating channels.50  
III.  Institutional Background  
This section provides a comprehensive institutional background on crystal 
methamphetamines. I first examine the effects of the drug, emphasizing the links 
between abuse and criminal behavior. Then, I focus on the peculiarities of its 
domestic market. Finally, I report the details of states and federal legislations 
limiting the access to meth chemical precursors.  
 
 
 
                                                
49 The Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act (DCDCA) removed the record-keeping and reporting 
exemption for distributors of single-entity ephedrine products and empowered the DEA to deny or revoke a 
distributor’s registration without proof of criminal intent.  In May 1995, the DEA shut down two suppliers 
that appear to have been providing more than 50 percent of the precursors used nationally to produce 
methamphetamine. This is probably the largest “supply” shock that has occurred in any illegal drug market in 
the United States and was made possible by the substantial concentration in the supply of methamphetamine 
precursors (Dobkin and Nicosia, 2009). 
       50 My study uses county-level annual variation on a sample of 38 US states while Dobkin et al. use 
state-monthly variation on all US states. See section III and IV for details. 
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Methamphetamines’ Effects 
 
Methamphetamine is a powerful, highly addictive stimulant that affects the 
central nervous system. Also known as meth, chalk, ice, and crystal, it costs 
between $20-25 for ¼ of grams. The drug takes the form of a white, odorless, 
bitter-tasting crystalline powder that easily dissolves in water or alcohol. 
Methamphetamine can be smoked, snorted, injected, or ingested to produce a 
release of high levels of dopamine and neurotransmitters into the brain. This 
generates sensations of self-confidence, energy, alertness, pleasure, and sexual 
arousal.  
With repeated use, meth exhausts accumulations of dopamine in the brain, 
simultaneously destroying the wiring of dopamine receptors. This process is what 
makes crystal meth extremely addictive, leading frequent users towards the 
physical impossibility of experiencing pleasure (a condition known as anhedonia) 
and the consequent intense craving for the drug itself.51  
Chronic abuse can lead to psychotic behavior, hallucinations, paranoia, violent 
rages, mood disturbances, insomnia, psychosis, poor coping abilities, sexual 
dysfunction, dermatological conditions and "meth mouth", a dental condition 
characterized by severe decay and loss of teeth, fracture and enamel erosion 
(NIDA, 2002). The termination of use can result in depression, fatigue, anxiety, 
agitation, vivid or lucid dreams, suicidal temptation, psychosis resembling 
schizophrenia and paranoia (ONDCP 2003).52 
                                                
51  Although both methamphetamine and cocaine increase levels of dopamine, administration of 
methamphetamine in animal studies leads to much higher levels of dopamine, because nerve cells respond 
differently to the two drugs. Cocaine prolongs dopamine actions in the brain by blocking the re-absorption 
(re-uptake) of the neurotransmitter by signaling nerve cells. At low doses, methamphetamine also blocks the 
re-uptake of dopamine, but it also increases the release of dopamine, leading to much higher concentrations 
in the synapse (the gap between neurons), which can be toxic to nerve terminals (National Institute of Drug 
Abuse, 2014).  
52 Unlike many other illegal drugs, methamphetamine is a drug that appeals equally to men and women. 
All of the national data sets show an almost equal gender split for self reported meth use. Users also tend to 
be White and in their 20s and 30s. Though both cocaine and methamphetamine are stimulants, a comparison 
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Methamphetamines-Related Criminal Activity: Supportive Evidence 
 
Crystal methamphetamine enormously raises the energy level of a meth-addict 
when under the influence. Conversely, it produces fatigue, excess sleep and 
suicidal temptations, when he is not. Consequently, while a significant proportion 
of methamphetamine-related property crimes can be attributed to users’ need to 
fund their drug purchases: 
 “… Many property and violent crimes are more likely a result of the 
pharmacological stimulant effects of this substance, which is at its peak when the 
extreme meth-user is under the influence ” (DEA, 2013). 53  
 
McKetin et al. (2014) administered a structured interview on a sample 238 
individuals, characterized by a different level of meth consumption and 
addiction.54 They highlight a clear dose–response increase in violent behavior. 
This effect was especially large for frequent methamphetamine use (i.e. 16+ days 
of use in the past month), which increased the odds of violent behavior 10 fold 
(threefold with less frequent use). These results indicate that the probability of 
violent behavior increases from 10% during periods of abstinence to 60% during 
periods of heavy methamphetamine abuse.55 
The National Association of Counties (NACO) administers an annual 
telephone survey to law enforcement agencies. Their scope is to investigate the 
                                                                                                                                
of characteristics of methamphetamine users and cocaine or crack users indicates that the two drugs do not, 
for the most part, share a common user group; that is, the drugs do not seem to substitute for each other or 
appeal to the same users (Hunt et. Al, 2006). 
53 To give a simple sense of the power of this illegal drug, while the high from cocaine can last from 30 
minutes to one hour the rush from methamphetamine lasts from 8 to 24 hours. More information can be 
found at: http://www.drugabuse.gov 
54 Recruitment of the cohort took place in 2006 and 2007, while follow-up interviews spanned the period 
from 2006 to 2010. 
       55  Several medical evidence related to methamphetamine and criminal behaviour exist. See also 
Cartier et al. (2006), Dark et al. (2010), Sommers and Baskin (2006). 
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impact of various illegal drugs on the proliferation of criminal activity.  In 2005, 
law enforcement officials from 500 counties in 45 US states were asked to select 
the illegal drug that was the biggest problem in their county. Crystal 
methamphetamine ranked first in 58% of the counties taking part to the survey, 
due to its pervasive power in generating thefts, property crimes and any sort of 
physical and sexual violence.56  
Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Data (ADAM) provides further insights. In 
2003 (the last year when this data were published before the implementation of 
OTC restrictions) the national mean of the adult male arrestee population for 
property and violent crimes who tested positive for methamphetamine was 4.7%. 
The national mean of arrestees who reported the use of methamphetamine within 
the previous year in 2003 was 7.7%. 
These figures hide a great deal of variation across geographical locations. As 
an example, ADAM program data indicate that 12% of adult male arrestees in 
Seattle tested positive for methamphetamine in 2003, while 32.1% tested positive 
in Spokane, 45% in Sacramento, 28% in Portland and 44% in San Diego (ADAM, 
2003).57  
The Domestic Market for Methamphetamines 
 
Imported illegal drugs such as cocaine or heroin have a hierarchical and 
complex distributional system. These substances originate from agricultural 
products that need to be harvested, processed at several junctures, shipped, and 
eventually packaged for different levels of distribution. These steps involve 
growers, extractors, producers, transporters, smugglers, distributors and numerous 
                                                
  56 Methamphetamine was followed in the ranking by cocaine (19%), marijuana (17%) and heroin (3%). 
57 More than 51% of the 500 responding local law enforcement agencies reported that up to 20% of 
arrests made in their counties during the last 5 years were methamphetamine related, while 17% reported that 
more than 50% were meth-related.  
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other people that are needed to move the illegal product across borders. 
Unlike heroin or powdered or crack cocaine, methamphetamine is a 100% 
synthetic product that can be easily and inexpensively manufactured with little 
equipment, few supplies, and almost no expertise in chemistry.   
For this reason, the meth “cook” – particularly in the case of smaller labs – is 
often a heavy meth user who turned into a producer. The “cook” decides to face 
the risk of a heavier criminal conviction to sustain the drug habit, fostered by the 
addictive power of the substance.  
This process translates into a lack of specialization across different roles in the 
distributional chains. This generates segmentation across various small illegal 
meth-markets. In fact, meth produced in small and medium “Mom and Pop Labs” 
is typically sold to a close network of family and acquaintances – usually sharing 
a high level of addiction with all the relative consequences – rather than to 
strangers in the streets.58 
 Ephedrine is the essential ingredient in the synthesis of crystal 
methamphetamine. This chemical is contained in medicines that help relieve the 
symptoms of a common cold or flu. If not in pure powder, this chemical needs to 
be separated from the tablets of cold medicine that contain it.59 For this purpose, 
                                                
58 Ethnographic reports indicate that the methamphetamine retail market is different from other drug 
markets in many areas and reflects in large part what has been termed a “cottage industry” model of drug 
distribution (Eck and Gersh, 2000). In contrast to larger or more organized networks, a large number of small 
groups, weak or little organizational structure and fluid group membership characterize this type of network 
where meth is produced, consumed and sold within a restrict number of people. The segmentation of the 
markets for methamphetamine is supported by evidence from Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) 
Program, showing that crack users are involved with more different dealers than meth users. Moreover, meth 
distribution typically happens indoor rather than outdoor. In Sacramento, arrestees report that on average they 
obtained meth from just over two dealers in the last 30 days; crack users report they obtained from, on 
average, over four dealers in the last 30 days (Hunt and Kuck, 2004). Many other sites with established meth 
use (San Diego, Phoenix, Portland) have similar data. 
59 Due to the clandestine nature of the process, information on the exact amount of cold medicines needed 
to produce one gram of methamphetamine is difficult to obtain. However, under perfect circumstances related 
to the quality of the inputs and the quality of the chemical process, 1 gram of pseudoephedrine translates in 
0.9 gram of pure methamphetamines. As an example, 1 box of Sudafed – a decongestant and is used to treat 
nasal and sinus congestion –contains 12 pills of 30mg of pseudoephedrine. So, three boxes can be used to 
produce 1 gram of pure crystal methamphetamines. More info at: 
http://www.textfiles.com/uploads/methmethod.txt  
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cold tablets are mixed with sodium hydroxide, anhydrous ammonia, iodine, 
matches containing red phosphorus, Drano (a drain cleaner product), ether, brake 
and lighter fluid and hydrochloric acid. These are all legal products that can be 
easily bought in local stores.60  
The entire chemical process is performed in self-made chemical labs hidden in 
flats, caravans, garages or hotel rooms. This generally takes about two days and 
can result in hundreds of thousands of methamphetamine doses. These “Mom and 
Pop” labs can produce methamphetamine easily and relatively cheaply. DEA 
estimates that with about $100 of materials, a “cook” or meth manufacturer using 
the chemicals described above can produce about $1,000 worth of the product in 
few hours (DEA, 2003).61 
OTC States and Federal Restrictions 
 
In the last 25 years, the federal government has passed several laws intended to 
cut the diversion of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine to illegal drug labs.62 This 
paper examines the effects of over the counter restrictions, implemented mainly in 
                                                
     60 The early manufacturers of meth in the U.S. used what is called the P2P method, named after the 
precursor substance employed, phenyl-2-propanone. This method yields relatively small amounts — less than 
10 pounds — of the lower quality dl-methamphetamine and, until regulation of this precursor, was the most 
common illegal production technique. This was the method associated with motorcycle gang production. 
Regulation of the precursors used in this method produced a change to the use of other substances, like 
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, which result in production of the higher quality d-methamphetamine (Hunt 
et al., 2007). 
       61 The majority of methamphetamine distributed across the U.S. arrives via Mexican Cartels or it is 
internally manufactured in “super-labs” capable of producing 10 pounds or more in a 24-hour period. This 
requires large-scale diversion of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine from legitimate industry by criminal 
organizations  (DEA, 2006). 
62 The first of these was the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 (CDTA), which regulated 
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in bulk powder form, but left processed forms unregulated. This was 
followed by the Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act of 1993, which placed restrictions on OTC 
ephedrine products (e.g. tablets) and increased DEA oversight of suppliers. Then, the Methamphetamine 
Control Act of 1996 tightened regulations on the sale of products containing methamphetamine precursors 
over 24 grams, but contained an exception for “blister packs”. Shortly thereafter, the Methamphetamine Anti-
Proliferation Act of 2000 lowered the thresholds from 25 to 9 grams, but blister packs remained exempt 
(Dobkin et al., 2013).  
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the year 2005. These policies were implemented as a reaction to a rapid increase 
in the number of toxic labs where the manufacturing of this substance occurred.  
These policies only regulated the access to the methamphetamine’s precursor 
chemicals, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, through: 1) quantity limitations, 2) 
sales environment restrictions, 3) proof of identification upon purchase 4) 
logbooks to prevent people from subverting the law by making repeated 
purchases.63 
Policy activity restricting the access to methamphetamine’s precursor 
chemicals has not been limited to the state level. Federal legislation took place in 
2006 through the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA). The last 
provision of the Federal act became effective September 30, 2006. This set a 
nationwide baseline standard for how to legally sell these products.64  
Figure 3 shows a map of the United States highlighting the year in which any 
OTC restriction (either at the state or federal level) was active for the first time in 
each state. 
[Figure 3] 
The state of Utah was the first to authorize an internal regulation in 2001, 
followed by Oklahoma in 2004. The remaining states can be divided in three 
different groups: 
                                                
63 An accurate description including details about all states’ regulations, date of approval and date of 
enactment can be found in the following report: “Pushing Back Against Meth: a Progress Report on the Fight 
Against Methamphetamines in the United States”, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 
November 2006. 
64 The Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (CMEA) was signed into law on March 9, 2006, 
to regulate, among other things, retail over-the-counter sales of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and 
phenylpropanolamine products. Retail provisions of the CMEA include daily sales limits and 30-day 
purchase limits, placement of product out of direct customer access, sales logbooks, customer ID verification, 
employee training, and self-certification of regulated sellers. Although the CMEA was effective nationwide, 
the State laws, which vary widely in content, were concurrently in effect. If the State law was less strict than 
the Federal CMEA on a certain issue, then compliance with the State provision was insufficient, and the 
Federal law, as a practical matter, was controlling. Conversely, if the State law was stricter on a certain issue 
than the Federal CMEA, then the State law, as a practical matter, was controlling standard on that point. 
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1) Early Adopters, enacting a state law in the year 2005, are: Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming; 
 2) Late Adopters, authorizing a state-internal law mainly at the beginning of 
2006, are: Idaho, Illinois, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Alaska, Maine and Vermont;  
3) CMEA Only adopters, where only the federal regulation became effective 
on September 30 2006. These are: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island. 
The timing of the enactment of these laws gave rise to multiple experimental 
designs. These will be discussed in the rest of the paper and online appendices. 
IV. Data Sources and Identification Strategy 
This section describes the main data sources. Then, it introduces the central 
DD design 1) providing and discussing significant pre-intervention differences 
between treated and control states and 2) arguing the validity of the critical 
identifying assumption of conditional parallel trends.  
Data Sources 
 
I assembled an original annual panel dataset, encompassing 2,200 US counties 
in 50 states from 2001 to 2010, representing 70% of counties with 94% 
population coverage for all the United States territory.65   
                                                
65 The final database is obtained merging and constructing county-level information from several sources 
described in this section. Missing observations on all datasets (FBI, DEA and all databases used US Census 
Bureau and from the Bureau of Labour Statistics-Current Population) and the presence of data-corruption and 
differences in counties’ names across sources determines the cross-sectional size of the final dataset. Data on 
 64 
County-level information on reported crimes, drugs-related arrests, number of 
police officers with arrest powers and civilian employees is accessed through the 
National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD).66 County-level files are 
created by NACJD, based on agency records in a file obtained from the FBI that 
also provides aggregated county totals. NACJD imputes missing data and then 
aggregates the data to the county-level.67 
The “Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data: Supplementary Homicide 
Reports” is accessed through the NAJCD. This provides incident-based 
information on criminal homicides reported to the police. This database contains 
information describing the victim, the offender, the weapon used and – when 
known by investigators – the different circumstances surrounding the homicide.68  
The National Clandestine Laboratory Register, provided by the US department 
of Justice, contains dates and addresses of locations where law enforcement 
agencies reported finding chemicals or other items that indicated the presence of 
either clandestine drug laboratories or dumpsites.69 I use this information to 
                                                                                                                                
crime are merged from 2001 (one year after that Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 was 
implemented and the year the state of Utah authorized for the first time) to 2010. Data on meth-labs seizures 
are public available from 2004. The main empirical analysis focuses from 2001 to 2006 (the year in which 
CMEA federal act was implemented).  
66 Data are freely downloadable at: 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/NACJD/guides/ucr.html#desc_cl (accessed date: September 
2012).  
67  In the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, property crime includes the offenses of 
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson. The property crime category includes arson because 
the offense involves the destruction of property; however, arson victims may be subjected to force. Because 
of limited participation and varying collection procedures by local law enforcement agencies, only limited 
data are available for arson. In the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, violent crime is 
composed of four offenses: murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault. Violent crimes are defined in the UCR Program as those offenses that involve force or threat of force. 
68 These data are reported at the FBI agency-level. I use crosswalks FBI data – accessed through NAJCD 
– to match police agencies to US counties. The crosswalk file is designed to provide geographic and other 
identification information for each record included in either the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform 
Crime Reporting (UCR) program files or in the Bureau of Justice Statistics' Census of State and Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA). In less than 2% of cases, agencies’ territory is included in multiple 
counties. Due to the impossibility of assigning the homicide category to the correct county, I drop these 
observations when collapsing agencies measures into county-level measure of different circumstances 
surrounding the homicide.  
69  These data are public available at: http://www.dea.gov/clan-lab/clan-lab.shtml. (Accessed Date: 
September 2013). Data on labs and on estimates of price and purity are constructed from the DEA’s System 
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generate a county-level annual-measure of the number of meth-labs seized by the 
local enforcement agencies. These data are available from 2004. 
The empirical analysis uses a wide set of county time-varying socio-economic 
controls. These are obtained from the US Census Bureau and from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics-Current Population.70 These variables, all summary statistics and 
other data sources will be discussed when relevant. 
Main DD Design: Empirical Strategy Discussion 
 
The main DD strategy estimates the differences in criminal activity between 
counties belonging to 1) Early Adopters states, that implemented OTC regulations 
in 2005 and 2) CMEA Only states, which did not approve any internal regulation, 
but were subject only to the CMEA federal act. Given that the CMEA federal act 
was implemented nationwide in the last part of 2006, I limit this DD analysis to 
the period 2001 – 2006. 
Pre-Existing Differences In Illegal-Drugs Penetration 
 
The endogenous decision of Early Adopters states to restrict the access of 
methamphetamines precursors needs to be addressed. A necessary step toward 
understanding the underlying reasons is provided by the analysis of pre-
intervention differences between Early Adopters and CMEA Only states.  
Tables I (A, B and C) summarize means and differences of relevant variables. 
In these tables, columns (1) and (2) report the mean of each variable for CMEA 
Only and Early Adopters states, respectively. Column (3) shows the difference 
                                                                                                                                
to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE) dataset. STRIDE is a forensic database populated 
primarily with DEA seizures and purchases that were sent to the lab for analysis. This dataset has been 
criticized because the recorded transactions are likely not representative of all drug transactions (ONDCP 
2004c; Joel L. Horowitz 2001). Nevertheless, STRIDE represents the best measures of the purity and prices 
of illegal drugs in the United States (Dobkin and Nicosia, 2009). 
70 I use http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa.shtml, (accessed date: December 2012). 
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between (1) and (2). I report 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. Means are 
computed in the pre-intervention period, from 2001 to 2004, by county or by 
state. Variables are normalized per 100,000 inhabitants, when meaningful. 
 
[Tables I (A-B-C)] 
Table I-A reveals that CMEA Only states (states that did not adopt any OTC 
regulation) were characterized by significantly less methamphetamines 
production. This information is summarized by a difference in meth-labs seizures 
of 5.7 per 100,000 inhabitants. Similarly, these states were experiencing 
significantly fewer hospitalizations due to methamphetamines abuse (-46.4), 
amphetamines abuse (-23.8) drug-related arrests for sale (-11.1) and possession (-
23.8) of other-dangerous non-narcotics. This is the FBI category containing 
crystal methamphetamines and for sale and possession of synthetic narcotics (-8.1 
and 14.2).  
In contrast, CMEA Only states were characterized by significantly higher 
arrests for: (i) possession of marijuana (+53), (ii) sale and possession of cocaine, 
heroin, and derivatives (+25.5 and +33.8). CMEA only states also experienced 
significantly more hospitalizations due to alcohol, cocaine, heroin, and over the 
counter medicines.  
The evidence on the pre-existing differences in criminal activity is more 
ambiguous (Table I-B). CMEA Only states were characterized by fewer larcenies 
and burglaries (-301.9 and -172.59) but by a higher level of robberies (+35.68). 
No significant differences are detected for murders or aggravated assaults. 
Counties belonging to control states experiencing fewer rapes (-2.13) but more 
episodes of arsons (+4.05).  
Table I-C summarizes pre-intervention differences of all socio-economic 
controls used in the analysis. For brevity considerations, I omit this discussion. 
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Parallel Trends Assumption 
 
The existence of significant differences in baseline characteristics between 
Early Adopters and CMEA Only states – due to the penetration of distinct illegal 
drugs in different US territory – provides a rationale for the endogenous take up 
of OTC restrictions from Early Adopters states.  
The presence of these significant differences does not undermine the validity 
of the results obtained using a DD estimator, if the assumption of conditional 
parallel trends in the outcome variable is satisfied.  
Figure 4 investigates the reliability of this assumption. I show the evolution in 
criminal activity – for both treated and control states – from 2001 to 2006. This is 
the period of analysis in this empirical exercise.  
 
[Figure 4] 
Figure 4 reveals a reassuring pattern of criminal activity before states’ 
intervention for larcenies, burglaries, murders and assaults. It also uncovers a 
sharp reduction in burglaries and larcenies in 2005 and in 2006 and a slight post-
regulation reduction in Early Adopters states for murders and aggravated 
assaults.71 Figure 4 also shows slight increase of violent crimes in CMEA Only 
states, after the enactment of OTC restrictions. This might indicate the presence of 
geographical relocation across states’ borders. This hypothesis will be explicitly 
tested.  
                                                
71 The validity of the assumption of conditional parallel trends is also supported by the event-study 
analysis shown in the next section. 
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V. Results 
This section reports results of the main DD design of the paper, where I use a 
reduced form approach to estimate the effects of OTC restrictions on crime. First, 
I show baseline results. Then, I present and discuss the event-study analysis. 
Third, I report robustness checks. Fourth, I perform two distinct triple-differences 
designs, to uncover significant differential impacts on the laws on crime across 
treated counties. Finally, I present two placebo tests on cyber and “white-collar” 
crimes.  
Baseline Results 
 
I use the following DD estimating equation: 
 𝑦!,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! + 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝛽! + 𝜀!,!,!                          (1) 
 
Here the subscript c indicates the county, s the state and t the year. Outcomes 
of interest are reported crimes, expressed as 𝑙𝑜𝑔 1+ 𝑥 . The measure of each 
crime 𝑥 is normalized per 100,000 people. The analysis focuses on 𝛽!. This is the 
coefficient associated with the interaction between Treated (an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to an Early Adopter state and zero if it 
belongs to a CMEA Only state) and Post (an indicator variable taking the value of 
1 for years 2005 and 2006, 0 otherwise). Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level.72 
The estimating regression (1) includes: 1) county fixed effects 𝛼!   , which 
absorb time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across counties; 2) year fixed 
effects 𝛾! , capturing common shocks and 3) a vector of county time-varying 
                                                
72 The sample includes 30 treated states and 8 control states. 
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socioeconomic controls 𝑋!,!,!! . These are: income per capita, percentage of people 
below the poverty line, unemployment, social security recipients, average 
monthly payment per subsidy, commercial banks and saving institutions per 
100,000 inhabitants, amount of banking and saving deposits, population density.  
 
[Tables II (A-B)] 
 
Table II-A and II-B show the results, with the baseline specification only 
including year FE and county FE alongside the interaction term Treated*Post. 
DD estimates reveal a significant reduction of around 7% to 7.5% for larceny 
and burglary and 13% for murder. P-values are below the 5% significance level. 
For aggravated assault, rape and robbery, I detect negative coefficients of similar 
magnitude (-5%, -7.8% and -8.3%, respectively). These are imprecisely 
estimated. No effect is detected for arson and motor vehicle theft. 
 
[Table III] 
 
Table III present results for larceny, burglary, assault and murder obtained 
using equation (1) and including all county time-varying observables. Results are 
similar in magnitude and precision to the baseline specification. The estimated 
coefficients are: larceny -8.1%, burglary -7.4% and murder -10%. These 
coefficients are precisely estimated with a p-value below 5%.73 
 
 
 
                                                
73 Results for all other crimes are similar in terms of size and magnitude to the ones presented in Table III 
panel B. Results are omitted for brevity considerations only. 
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Event-study Analysis 
 
This section discusses and presents the results for the event-study analysis. I 
use the following estimating equation:  
 
𝑦!,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! + (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!  )!""#!!!""# 𝛽!,! + 𝜀!,!,!                          (2) 
 
The analysis focuses on 𝛽!,!. These are the coefficients associated with the 
interaction of Treated (an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the county 
belongs to an Early Adopter state and zero otherwise) and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!     (an indicator 
variable for each year). The omitted category is the interaction of Treated and the 
dummy for 2004. This is the year preceding the enactment of OTC restriction in 
Early Adopters states. Other details are as in equation (1). 
 This estimation technique offers several advantages. In particular, while 
explicitly testing for the presence of significant differential pre-trends in criminal 
activity, it allows for a flexible non-parametric estimation of the effects of OTC 
restrictions on crime. This might have had differential effects in the year or the 
implementation of the laws, or the year after. Table IV-A and IV-B present the 
results. 
[Tables IV (A-B)] 
For larceny, I detect a reduction of 10.4% in the year 2005 and of 12.7% in the 
year 2006. Coefficients are precisely estimated, always below the 1% significance 
level. Pre-intervention coefficients grow in magnitude (from -0.04 in 2001 to -
0.02 in 2004). A significant coefficient is detected only in 2002, hence three years 
before intervention. For burglary, I detect 8% to 9.8% reduction in the year 2005 
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and 2006, respectively. Significance levels are below 5%. While pre-intervention 
coefficients increase overtime (from -0.03 in 2001 to -0.002 in 2004) no 
significant differential pre-trend is detected. Results for aggravated assault are 
reported in columns (3). I detect a decrease of 7.7% in 2005, significant at the 
10% level. The coefficient in year 2006 is around -4.3%. This is imprecisely 
estimated. For murder, columns (4), I detect a decrease of 16% in 2005 and 7% in 
2006. The coefficient in 2005 has a significance level below 5%, while the 
coefficient in 2006 is imprecisely estimated.74 For aggravated assault and murder, 
no significant pre-intervention pattern is detected. Figure 5 plots the coefficients 
of the event-study together with 95% confidence intervals reported.  
[Figure 5] 
For larceny and burglary, this figure shows the presence of a slight pre-
intervention increasing trend in treated states, possibly due to the spreading of the 
meth-epidemic and its role in generating crime. Nevertheless, crucially for the 
interpretation of the results of this paper, this increase goes in the opposite 
direction of the crime-reducing effect of OTC restrictions. 
Table IV-B presents the results obtained through estimating equation (2) for 
robbery, rape, arson and motor vehicle theft. I do not detect any significant 
reduction. 
Robustness Checks 
 
Tables V (A to E) present the main robustness checks for the event-study 
analysis. Table V-A shows the results when I add to the baseline specification 
measures of police officers with arrest powers and civilian employees.  
                                                
74 Using this specification no significant effect is detected for motor-vehicle theft, robbery, arson and rape. 
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These controls, while deepening the extent of the analysis potentially capturing 
time-varying confounding factors, are not included in the baseline specification. 
In fact, these can be considered as potential outcomes of policies implemented to 
eradicate methamphetamines production. Table V-A shows that the magnitude of 
the coefficients and the significance levels are stable across crimes and are almost 
identical to the baseline specification. 
[Tables V (A-E)] 
Table V-B includes states-specific linear trends. This specification increases 
the magnitude of the estimates for all the category of property and violent crimes 
(i.e. estimates are more negative).  
This result allows for a variety of interpretations. State-specific trends might be 
an unobserved confounder in the analysis. This is the case if the endogenous 
decision to adopt OTC restriction is positively correlated linear crime trends. In 
other words, if factors associated with rising crime increased the pressure for the 
reform, the inclusion of state-specific time trends, while absorbing this effect, 
would bias baseline estimates down. From an econometric perspective, the 
inclusion of state-specific trends plausibly generates collinearity with the 
interactions of interest, (that uses a state*year variation), potentially altering and 
amplifying the effects of the laws on criminal activity. Despite the difficulty of 
disentangling these separate effects, I find encouraging that the inclusion of state-
specific trends strengthens the crime-reducing effects of OTC restrictions, rather 
than weakening it.75 
                                                
       75 Almost identical results are obtained when states-specific quadratic trends are included. Results are 
omitted for brevity considerations only. I perform this same robustness for the baseline difference in 
differences, where I use the interaction between treated*post.  The inclusion of states-specific linear trends 
produces essentially the same results that are shown in table A2 of the appendix. 
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Table V-C shows the results when I weight the regression by the coverage 
indicator reported by the agency, a measure of the reliability of the information on 
crime available to the researcher.76 Results are stable to this specification. 
Tables V-D and V-E show the results where I use as outcome variable the 1) 
linear measure of crime per 100,000 people or 2) the count measure of crimes as 
outcome variable using the Poisson fixed-effects estimator. This robustness check 
is performed to examine the sensitivity of the estimates, due to over-dispersion of 
the outcome variables (particularly acute to the case of murder, with a men of 3.2 
and a standard deviation of 5.7). Results do not depend from the functional form 
used and are robust to both these specifications.  
Heterogeneity in the Results: Two Triple DD Designs  
 
Small clandestine production and abuse of crystal meth typically takes place in 
rural, low populated counties. This partly reflects that meth-producers have to 
hide the illegal production process. In fact this generates intoxicating fumes and 
frequent explosions that have to be hidden from the public and from law 
enforcement officers (DEA, 2006).   
 [Figure 6] 
Figure 6 shows a map of the distribution of labs in the United States in 2004. 
Categories expressed in deciles, for illustrative purposes only. The production of 
methamphetamines is spread across the entire county, with higher concentration 
in central-east states, especially Missouri, Tennessee, Arkansas, Kansas and 
Indiana.   
Figure 7 investigates this relationship, showing the scatterplot and the 
quadratic fit of the number of methamphetamines’ labs seized by law enforcement 
                                                
76 The Coverage Indicator ranges from 100, indicating that all ORIs in the county reported for 12 months 
in the year, to 0, indicating that all data in the county are based on estimates, not reported data. 
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agencies in 2004 in each county, normalized per 100,000 people, and population 
density in 2001.77 As expected, it illustrates that a higher concentration of meth-
labs seizures is found in low-populated, rural counties. 
[Figure 7] 
These facts lead me to explore the presence of significant differential effect 
within treated states. I implement two distinct triple differences designs. First, I 
use as third interaction a county population’s density. Then, I use as third 
interaction term the pre-reform concentration of meth-labs seized by law 
enforcement agencies. I employ the following estimating equation: 
 𝑦!,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! + 𝑇 ∗ 𝑃 𝛽! + 𝐷 ∗ 𝑃 𝛽! + 𝑇 ∗ 𝑃 ∗ 𝐷 𝛽! + 𝜀!,!,!    (3) 
 
Here T=Treated, P=Post (as in the baseline DD design, equation (1)) and 
D=population density in 2001 (first design) and meth-labs seized in 2004 (second 
design).78 Table VI shows the results for the first design. 
[Table VI] 
The triple interaction term has a positive coefficient in all specifications. For 
burglary the coefficient of 0.018 is significant at the 5% level. For aggravated 
assault the coefficient of 0.015 is significant at the 10%, for murder the 
coefficient is 0.04 significant at the 1%.  
In the second experimental design, I use as a third interaction term the county-
level number of meth-labs seizures normalized per 100,000 people (fixed in 
2004). This approximates the underlying pre-determined local production of 
                                                
77 I use density in 2001 and meth-labs seizures in 2004 because this is the first year when data are available 
for the two measures, respectively. 
78 The interaction between density and treated is absorbed by county FE.  
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crystal-meth. The estimating equation is otherwise identical to (3). Table VII 
shows the results. 
[Table VII] 
I detect a negative coefficient of the triple interaction term, significant at the 
5% level for larceny and assault (-.01 and - .04). For murder, the triple interaction 
is high in magnitude (-0.048) but not significantly different from 0.  
To interpret the results, I note that a one-unit increase in the pre-intervention 
normalized measure of labs per 100,000 people generates an additional 1.3% 
decrease in larcenies and 3.8% in aggravated assaults. 
Overall, this exercise suggests that the enactment of OTC restriction reduced 
crime more in treated rural counties with a higher predetermined concentration of 
domestic methamphetamines production and – plausibly – of extreme abusers. 
Two Placebo Tests: Cyber & Financial Crime 
 
In this section I develop placebo tests on two distinct crime-categories that – 
reasonably – should not have been affected by the enactment of OTC restrictions. 
These are cybercrimes and financial “white-collar” crime. 
Cybercrimes are fraud-types such as auction fraud, non-delivery, and 
credit/debit card fraud, as well as non-fraudulent complaints, such as computer 
intrusions and spam/unsolicited e-mail. State-level measures of cybercrime are 
obtained from the annual Internet crime report prepared by the National White 
Collar Crime Center and the FBI.79 Due to the trans-national nature of this crime, 
I have analyzed both the state-level measures of complainants and perpetrators 
per 100,000 people. 
                                                
79 These are accessible at http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreports.aspx  
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Financial institution fraud and failure investigations (FIF) include mortgage 
and loan fraud, insider fraud, check fraud, counterfeit negotiable instruments and 
check kiting. These data are obtained through the FBI web portal.80 These annual 
data are at the FBI field office level and are distinct by indictments and 
convictions. 
[Figure 8] 
 
Figure 8 shows the results of estimating equation (2) for both categories of 
crime. To perform this analysis, I collapsed the mean of socio-economic controls 
at the state-year level. Due to the placebo nature of the exercise, I plot a more 
conservative confidence interval of 90%. As expected, no significant effect is 
detected for cyber and financial crimes.81   
 
                                                
80 Accessible at https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/crimestats  
81 Tables are omitted for brevity considerations and are available upon request. 
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Figure 3: Map of US Restrictions Against Meth Chemical Precursors 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES: This figure shows the year in which the first OTC restriction (either at the state or federal level) was 
enacted in each US State. Utah enacted a state regulation in 2001, followed by Oklahoma in 2004. The remaining 
states can be divided in three different groups: 1) Early adopters, implementing a state law in the year 2005, are: 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming; 2) Late 
adopters, enacting a state-internal law mainly at the beginning of 2006, are: Idaho, Illinois, North Carolina, Ohio, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Alaska, Maine and Vermont; 3) CMEA only adopters, adopting only the federal 
regulation the 30th of September of 2006, are: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island. Alaska and Hawaii are omitted for illustrative purposes only. Both enacted a state 
law in 2005. Source (DEA, 2007) 
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Figure 4: Graphical Analysis 
                
 
 NOTES: This figure shows the evolution of larceny, burglary, aggravated assault and murder in states that 
adopted an internal regulation in 2005 (“2005 adopters”) and in states where only the federal act CMEA was 
passed the 30th of September 2006 (“CMEA adopters”). For the case of murder I have excluded the counties 
belonging to New York city due to the 3000 victims of the 9/11 being recorded in the Murder category by the 
UCR. These counties are Queens, Richmond, New York, Kings and Bronx. 
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Figure 5: Event Study Analysis 
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NOTES: This figure shows the plot of the coefficients obtained using the  
event study estimation as in equation (2) for burglary, larceny, assault and 
murder.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The omitted 
category is the interaction between the two dummy variables “treated” and 
“year 2004”. Confidence intervals at the 95% level are reported. 
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Figure 6: Map of Meth-Labs Seizures 
 
 
NOTES: This Figure shows the geographical distribution (expressed in deciles) of meth-labs seized by law enforcement 
agencies from 2004 to 2010. Alaska and Hawaii are eliminated from the figure for illustrative purposes only. Source 
(DEA, 2012). 
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Figure 7: Meth-Labs and Population Density 
 
                         NOTES: This figure shows the scatterplot and the quadratic fit of the number ofmeth-labs 
seizured in 2004 in each county normalized per 100,000 people and the county population 
density in 2001. Both distributions are trimmed at the top 5% for illustrative purpose only. 
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Figure 8: Placebo Tests on Cyber and White-Collar Crimes 
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                       Notes: This figure shows a placebo test on Internet and financial crime using 
the event study estimation of equation (2) with mean of control variables 
collapsed at the state-year level. Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. The omitted category is the interaction between the two dummy 
variables “treated” and “year 2004”. Due to the placebo nature of this 
exercise, I plot 90% confidence intervals. 
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Table I–A 
Pre-Intervention Differences, Illegal Drugs Penetration 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Control Treated Difference 
    
Meth-labs Seizures 0.3 6.08 -5.77*** 
Meth-related Hospitalizations 20.43 66.88 -46.46*** 
Amphetamines-related Hospitalizations 4.92 21.79 -16.87*** 
Other dangerous non narcotics (arrests 
possession) 
28 51.81 -23.82*** 
Other dangerous non narcotics (arrests 
sale) 
7.09 18.28 -11.19*** 
Synthetics narcotics (arrests possession) 12.46 26.86 -14.40*** 
Synthetics narcotics (arrests sale) 4.84 12.95 -8.11*** 
    
Cocaine and Heroin (arrests possession) 93.18 59.31 33.87*** 
Cocaine and Heroin (arrests sale) 54.37 29.22 25.15*** 
Marijuana (arrests possession) 272.48 219.89 52.59*** 
Marijuana (arrests sale) 28.88 32.66 -3.78** 
Alcohol Hospitalizations 753.01 399.96 353.05*** 
Cocaine Hospitalizations 446.3 149.98 296.32*** 
Marijuana Hospitalizations 359.84 240.85 118.99*** 
Heroin Hospitalizations 343.14 34.57 308.57*** 
Over the Counter Hospitalizations 1.69 1.46 0.24*** 
 
Notes: This table shows the pre-intervention mean (2001 to 2004 included) computed at the county level 
(arrests) and at the state level (hospitalization) in control states (“CMEA only”, column 1) and treated states 
(“Early Adopters”, column 2). Column 3 shows the t-test of the difference between column 1 and column 2. 
Arrests and hospitalizations are expressed per 100,000 people. 
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Table I–B 
Pre-Intervention Differences, Criminal Activity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Control Counties Treated Counties Difference 
    
Larceny 1637.81 1939.75 -301.94*** 
Burglary 478.22 650.81 -172.59*** 
Robbery 84.2 48.53 35.68*** 
Motor/Vehicle Theft 211.08 210.07 1.01 
Murder 3.62 3.89 -0.27 
Assault 228.37 242.02 -13.66 
Rape 25.67 27.81 -2.13** 
Arson 22.29 18.23 4.05*** 
Notes: This table shows the pre-intervention mean (2001 to 2004 included) computed at the 
county level in counties belonging to control states (“CMEA only”, column 1) and county belonging 
to states that adopted a state regulation in 2005 (“Early Adopters”, column 2). Column 3 shows the t-
test of the difference between column 1 and column 2. Crimes are expressed per 100,000 people. 
 
 
Table I–C 
 Pre-Intervention Differences, Socio-Economic Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Control Counties Treated Counties Difference 
Banks and commercial 
deposits 
34.56 40.27 -5.71*** 
Total deposits 1686258.58 1266475.58 419783.00*** 
People below the poverty 
line 
18547.59 19236.64 -689.05*** 
Social security recipients 428.16 387.94 40.22*** 
Density 1846.44 224.65 1621.79*** 
Unemployment % 5.07 5.74 -0.67*** 
Standardized measure of 
poverty 
0.1 0.14 -0.04*** 
Income per capital 32072.9 25477.1 6595.80*** 
Police 2.46 4.27 -1.80*** 
Police-Administrative 1.73 3.75 -2.02*** 
Notes: This table shows the pre-intervention mean (2001 to 2004 included) computed at the county level 
in counties belonging to control states (“CMEA only”, column 1) and county belonging to states that 
adopted a state regulation in 2005 (“Early Adopters”, column 2). Column 3 shows the t-test of the 
difference between column 1 and column 2. Variables are expressed per 100,000 people, when meaningful. 
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TABLE II-A: Difference in Differences 
Baseline Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
     
Treated * Post -0.0750** -0.0720** -0.0495 -0.131** 
 (0.0387) (0.0328) (0.0522) (0.0573) 
     
Observations 9,687 9,687 9,687 9,687 
R-squared 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.001 
Number of counties 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
 Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. The estimating sample goes 
from 2001 to 2006 included. Year FE and county FE are included. Outcome variables are larceny, 
burglary, aggravated assault and murder. These are expressed as ln(1+x), where x is the crime measure 
normalized  per 100,000 inhabitants. Treated*Post is the interaction of the variable treated (a dummy 
taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the provision of methamphetamine 
precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a state where only CMEA was implemented) with 
Post (a dummy that takes the value of 1 for 2005 and 2006 and 0 otherwise).  
 
 
TABLE II-B: Difference in Differences 
Baseline Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Robbery Arson Rape Vehicle 
Theft 
     
Treated * Post -0.0784 0.0449 -0.0830 -0.0114 
 (0.0582) (0.103) (0.0873) (0.0393) 
     
Observations 9,687 9,687 9,687 9,687 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 
Number of counties 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. The estimating sample goes 
from 2001 to 2006 included. Year FE and county FE are included. Outcome variables are robbery, 
arson, aggravated assault and murder. These are expressed as ln(1+x), where x is the crime measure 
normalized  per 100,000 inhabitants. Treated*Post is the interaction of the variable treated (a dummy 
taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the provision of methamphetamine 
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precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a state where only CMEA was implemented) with 
Post (a dummy that takes the value of 1 for 2005 and 2006 and 0 otherwise).  
 
 
 
TABLE III: Robustness Check 
Baseline Estimation + All County Observables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
     
Treated * Post -0.0818** -0.0744** -0.0406 -0.103** 
 (0.0382) (0.0317) (0.0524) (0.0527) 
     
Observations 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 
R-squared 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.005 
Number of counties 1,625 1,625 1,625 1,625 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. The estimating sample goes 
from 2001 to 2006 included. Year FE and county FE are included. Outcome variables are larceny, 
burglary, aggravated assault and murder. These are expressed as ln(1+x), where x is the crime measure 
normalized  per 100,000 inhabitants. Treated*Post is the interaction of the variable treated (a dummy 
taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the provision of methamphetamine 
precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a state where only CMEA was implemented) with 
Post (a dummy that takes the value of 1 for 2005 and 2006 and 0 otherwise). I include the following 
county observables: income per capita, percentage of people below the poverty line, unemployment, 
social security recipients, average monthly payment per subsidy, commercial banks and saving 
institutions per 100,000 inhabitants, amount of banking and saving deposits, population density. 
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TABLE IV-A 
 Event study estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
     
Treated * 2001 -0.0460 -0.0311 -0.0267 -0.0347 
 (0.0501) (0.0533) (0.0513) (0.0745) 
 
Treated * 2002 -0.0660** -0.0267 -0.0550 -0.0737 
 (0.0267) (0.0392) (0.0531) (0.0629) 
 
Treated * 2003 -0.0229 -0.00283 0.00101 0.0475 
 (0.0289) (0.0280) (0.0364) (0.0660) 
 
 
Treated * 2005 
 
-0.104*** 
 
-0.0805** 
 
-0.0775* 
 
-0.160** 
 (0.0308) (0.0326) (0.0434) (0.0787) 
 
Treated * 2006 -0.127*** -0.0987** -0.0434 -0.0755 
 (0.0448) (0.0474) (0.0469) (0.0929) 
     
Observations 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 
R-squared 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.005 
Number of counties 1,625 1,625 1,625 1,625 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. I use estimating equation (2). 
I interact the variable treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has 
regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a 
state where only CMEA was implemented) with a dummy for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006). The omitted category is the interaction between treated and the dummy for the year 2004 
(the year before the enactment of the states laws. Outcome variables are all expressed as ln(1+x), 
where x is the crime measure normalized  per 100,000 inhabitants. I also include county FE, year FE 
and all county observables. Outcomes are larceny, burglary, assault and murder. 
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TABLE IV-B 
 Event study estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Robbery Rape Arson Vehicle 
Theft 
     
Treated * 2001 0.101* -0.0509 -0.0240 -0.0484 
 (0.0583) (0.0983) (0.0758) (0.0578) 
 
Treated * 2002 0.0575 -0.0403 -0.0180 -0.0555 
 (0.0685) (0.0684) (0.0725) (0.0504) 
 
Treated * 2003 0.0681 -0.104* 0.0735 -0.0319 
 (0.0481) (0.0606) (0.0777) (0.0400) 
 
 
Treated * 2005 
 
-0.0520 
 
-0.144* 
 
0.0530 
 
-0.0463 
 (0.0508) (0.0761) (0.113) (0.0364) 
 
Treated * 2006 -0.00849 -0.125 0.0697 -0.0647 
 (0.0783) (0.149) (0.0923) (0.0386) 
     
Observations 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 
R-squared 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.005 
Number of counties 1,625 1,625 1,625 1,625 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. I use estimating equation (2). I 
interact the variable treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has 
regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a state 
where only CMEA was implemented) with a dummy for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). 
The omitted category is the interaction between treated and the dummy for the year 2004 (the year before 
the enactment of the states laws. Outcome variables are all expressed as ln(1+x), where x is the crime 
measure normalized  per 100,000 inhabitants. I also include county FE, year FE and all county 
observables. Outcomes are robbery, rape, arson and vehicle theft. 
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TABLE V-A: Robustness 
Baseline + Police 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
     
Treated * 2001 -0.0426 -0.0300 -0.0244 -0.0353 
 (0.0495) (0.0525) (0.0514) (0.0744) 
 
Treated * 2002 -0.0625** -0.0255 -0.0527 -0.0744 
 (0.0260) (0.0386) (0.0530) (0.0627) 
 
Treated * 2003 -0.0202 -0.00197 0.00243 0.0474 
 (0.0286) (0.0276) (0.0362) (0.0661) 
 
     
Treated * 2005 -0.102*** -0.0798** -0.0768* -0.159* 
 (0.0306) (0.0325) (0.0445) (0.0790) 
     
Treated * 2006 -0.128*** -0.0991** -0.0445 -0.0748 
 (0.0450) (0.0479) (0.0474) (0.0930) 
     
Observations 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 
R-squared 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.005 
Number of counties 1,625 1,625 1,625 1,625 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard 
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. I use estimating equation (2). I interact the 
variable treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the 
provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a state where only 
CMEA was implemented) with a dummy for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). The omitted 
category is the interaction between treated and the dummy for the year 2004 (the year before the 
enactment of the states laws. Outcome variables are all expressed as ln(1+x), where x is the crime 
measure normalized  per 100,000 inhabitants. I also include county FE, year FE, all county observables 
and police officers with arrests powers and with administrative duties. Outcomes are larceny, burglary, 
assault and murder. 
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TABLE V-B Robustness 
Baseline + States’ Specific Linear Trends 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
     
Treated * 2002 -0.0348 -0.00563 -0.0363 -0.0508 
 (0.0260) (0.0225) (0.0479) (0.0578) 
     
Treated * 2003 -0.00829 0.00658 0.0104 0.0583 
 (0.0286) (0.0195) (0.0294) (0.0571) 
 
     
Treated * 2005 -0.119*** -0.0894** -0.0863* -0.172* 
 (0.0361) (0.0412) (0.0435) (0.0981) 
 
Treated * 2006 -0.159*** -0.121 -0.0649 -0.0971 
 (0.0582) (0.0726) (0.0636) (0.132) 
     
Observations 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 
R-squared 0.034 0.027 0.021 0.009 
Number of fips 1,625 1,625 1,625 1,625 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. I use estimating equation (2). 
I interact the variable treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has 
regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a 
state where only CMEA was implemented) with a dummy for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006). The omitted category is the interaction between treated and the dummy for the year 2004 
(the year before the enactment of the states laws. Outcome variables are all expressed as ln(1+x), 
where x is the crime measure normalized  per 100,000 inhabitants. I also include county FE, year FE, 
all county observables and states’ specific linear trends. Outcomes are larceny, burglary, assault and 
murder. 
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TABLE V-C: Robustness 
Baseline Weighted By FBI Coverage Indicator 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
     
Treated * 2001 -0.0435 -0.0281 -0.0283 -0.0393 
 (0.0500) (0.0529) (0.0508) (0.0752) 
 
Treated * 2002 -0.0630** -0.0248 -0.0559 -0.0749 
 (0.0261) (0.0387) (0.0525) (0.0630) 
 
Treated * 2003 -0.0215 -0.00169 -0.000712 0.0488 
 (0.0282) (0.0276) (0.0360) (0.0664) 
 
 
Treated * 2005 
 
-0.0969*** 
 
-0.0756** 
 
-0.0748* 
 
-0.160* 
 (0.0288) (0.0313) (0.0413) (0.0795) 
 
Treated * 2006 -0.122*** -0.0940* -0.0426 -0.0783 
 (0.0448) (0.0477) (0.0469) (0.0939) 
     
Observations 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 
R-squared 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.005 
Number of Counties 1,625 1,625 1,625 1,625 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. I use estimating equation (2). I 
interact the variable treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has 
regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a state 
where only CMEA was implemented) with a dummy for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). 
The omitted category is the interaction between treated and the dummy for the year 2004 (the year before 
the enactment of the states laws. Outcome variables are all expressed as ln(1+x), where x is the crime 
measure normalized  per 100,000 inhabitants. I also include county FE, year FE and all county 
observables. Outcomes are larceny, burglary, assault and murder. I weight the regression using the FBI 
Coverage indicator, a measure of the reliability on the information for crime in each county/year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 94 
 
 
 
TABLE V-D: Robustness 
Linear Measure of Crime 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
     
Treated * 2001 3.126 -15.75 -8.901 -1.655* 
 (50.11) (22.15) (9.316) (0.847) 
     
Treated * 2002 -35.80 0.308 -6.999 -0.350 
 (32.90) (17.04) (11.26) (0.305) 
     
Treated * 2003 16.23 4.144 0.163 0.0475 
 (28.57) (10.73) (5.419) (0.258) 
 
     
Treated * 2005 -88.02*** -22.94* -10.22* -0.597* 
 (27.01) (13.77) (5.596) (0.349) 
 
Treated * 2006 -176.6*** -37.35 -4.329 -0.478 
 (48.80) (23.61) (7.616) (0.333) 
     
Observations 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 
R-squared 0.035 0.011 0.007 0.006 
Number of Counties 1,625 1,625 1,625 1,625 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. I use estimating equation (2). I 
interact the variable treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has 
regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a state 
where only CMEA was implemented) with a dummy for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). 
The omitted category is the interaction between treated and the dummy for the year 2004 (the year before 
the enactment of the states laws. Outcome variables are all expressed per 100,000 people I also include 
county FE, year FE and all county observables. Outcomes are larceny, burglary, assault and murder. 
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TABLE V-E: Robustness 
Fixed Effects Poisson Estimation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
     
Treated * 2001 -0.00238 -0.0151 -0.0422 -0.416*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0242) (0.0307) (0.152) 
 
Treated * 2002 -0.0243* 0.00181 -0.0346 -0.0964 
 (0.0135) (0.0204) (0.0311) (0.0735) 
 
Treated * 2003 0.00878 0.00940 0.000143 0.0149 
 (0.0103) (0.0168) (0.0212) (0.0815) 
 
 
Treated * 2005 
 
-0.0481*** 
 
-0.0368* 
 
-0.0460** 
 
-0.178** 
 (0.0103) (0.0199) (0.0203) (0.0809) 
 
Treated * 2006 -0.0913*** -0.0628*** -0.0210 -0.160** 
 (0.0138) (0.0230) (0.0269) (0.0800) 
     
Observations 9,648 9,648 9,648 9,009 
Number of 
counties 
1,619 1,619 1,619 1,511 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County 
Observables 
YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard 
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. I use estimating equation (2). I interact the 
variable treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the 
provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a state where only CMEA 
was implemented) with a dummy for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). The omitted category 
is the interaction between treated and the dummy for the year 2004 (the year before the enactment of the 
states laws. I also include county FE, year FE and all county observables. Outcomes are larceny, burglary, 
assault and murder. I use a fixed effects Poisson regression with the count number of crimes as outcome 
variable. 
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TABLE VI: Triple Difference in Differences 
Population Density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
     
Treated * Post -0.0861** -0.0898*** -0.0560 -0.129** 
 (0.0397) (0.0319) (0.0534) (0.0540) 
 
Treated * Post* Density 0.00304 0.0179** 0.0148* 0.0394*** 
 (0.00469) (0.00838) (0.00844) (0.00794) 
     
Observations 9,585 9,585 9,585 9,585 
R-squared 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.006 
Number of counties 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard 
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. The estimating sample goes from 2001 to 2006 
included. Year FE, county FE and all county observables are included. Outcome variables are larceny, 
burglary, aggravated assault and murder. These are expressed as ln(1+x), where x is the crime measure 
normalized  per 100,000 inhabitants. Treated*Post is the interaction of the variable treated (a dummy taking 
the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors 
chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a state where only CMEA was implemented) with Post (a dummy that 
takes the value of 1 for 2005 and 2006 and 0 otherwise). Density is obtained as the ratio of land area divided 
by county population in 2001. The interaction Post*Density is included in all the specifications. 
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TABLE VII: Triple Difference in Differences 
Meth-Labs Seizures Pre-Reform 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
     
Treated * Post -0.0846** -0.0781** -0.0300 -0.0804 
 (0.0398) (0.0351) (0.0561) (0.0624) 
 
Treated * Post * Labs -0.0132** -0.00888 -0.0382** -0.0482 
 (0.00646) (0.0107) (0.0179) (0.0438) 
     
Observations 9,646 9,646 9,646 9,646 
R-squared 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.005 
Number of fips 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
    Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard 
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. The estimating sample goes from 2001 to 
2006 included. Year FE, county FE and all county observables are included. Outcome variables are 
larceny, burglary, aggravated assault and murder. These are expressed as ln(1+x), where x is the crime 
measure normalized  per 100,000 inhabitants. Treated*Post is the interaction of the variable treated (a 
dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the provision of 
methamphetamine precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a state where only CMEA was 
implemented) with Post (a dummy that takes the value of 1 for 2005 and 2006 and 0 otherwise). Labs is the 
number of meth-labs seizures in the county in 2004. The interaction Post*Labs is included in all the 
specifications.
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Chapter IV – Drugs and Crime in the US: Exploring the Underlying 
Mechanisms 
By ROCCO D’ESTE  
           This chapter investigates the mechanisms behind the reduction in crime.  I detect a 38% 
reduction in operating meth-labs, no strong sign of relocation of criminal activity across 
states’ borders, substitution in the demand or supply of other illegal substances, police 
crackdown on meth-abusers. I hence propose a simple theoretical framework that 
matches qualitative features of this market. I model the decision process of a typical 
“meth-head” hit by OTC restrictions via an unexpected crystal-meth price-shock. This 
framework guides and sharpens the interpretation of the results, providing an additional 
set of testable predictions, corroborated in the subsequent analysis. OTC restrictions led 
to: i) a drop in meth consumption, ii) an increase in meth-related hospitalizations 
associated with detox, withdrawal symptoms and rehab, iii) heterogeneous and non-
monotonic effects on criminal activity across US states.  
 
I. Estimating the Disruption of Meth Domestic Production 
States regulations targeted the domestic production of crystal 
methamphetamines. To evaluate the effectiveness of these supply-side 
interventions, I include DEA data on the number of clandestine labs seized by law 
enforcement agencies. The ideal data would be obtained from a census of all the 
meth-labs, before and after the enactment of states’ regulations, in treated and 
control states. These data clearly do not exist.  
 As Dobkin et al. (2014) discuss, the number of labs discovered by law 
enforcement agents is an unknown fraction of the total number of labs in 
operation. The probability of detecting a lab can be expressed as a function of: 
law enforcement agents’ effort, the likelihood of a lab catching fire due to the 
highly unstable synthesis process, the reports from the public to local enforcement 
agencies and other factors. The following equation describes the relationship 
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between the differential percentage change in the number of labs detected and in 
the number of labs effectively operating: 
 %Δ 𝐷! − 𝐷! = %Δ 𝑝! − 𝑝! 1+%Δ 𝐿! − 𝐿! +%Δ 𝐿! − 𝐿!                                     (4) 
 
Here %Δ = !"#$!!"#!"# , with post and pre referring to the period before and after 
the regulation, the subscripts T and C indicate treated and control states, 𝐷 
denotes the number of labs, 𝑝 denotes the probability of detection and 𝐿 denotes 
the “true” number of labs.  
If the probability of detection is unaffected by OTC regulations %∆𝑝! =%∆𝑝!  then the differential percentage change in the number of discovered labs 
represents an unbiased estimate of the reduction in the number of labs effectively 
operating.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that OTC laws slightly increased the probability 
that a given lab was detected in treated states post-regulations. In fact, some 
police departments might have visited the residences of people whose names 
appeared repeatedly in OTC sales logbooks. In this is so and %∆𝑝! > %∆𝑝! , 
then using the percent change in the number of labs detected is likely to produce a 
lower bound estimate of the “true” reduction in the number of meth-labs.82 
 
[Figure 9] 
Figure 9 shows the total number of labs by year, with a decline of almost 50% 
from 2004 to 2005. The average number of methamphetamines labs seizures is 
2.17 per 100.000 inhabitants with a standard deviation of 6.38.  
                                                
82  This line of reasoning applies only to the number of meth-labs but NOT to the quantity of 
methamphetamines produced. 
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Table VIII shows the result of estimating equation (1). The number of 
clandestine labs seized by law-enforcement agencies is available from 2004 
onwards. I hence focus the analysis on the years 2004 to 2006. All the other 
details of this regression are the same as in estimating equation (1). 
[Table VIII] 
     Column (1) shows results for the baseline specification, when I include year 
FE and state FE. In column (2) I add to the baseline specification county FE. In 
column (3) I include all county observables. As shown in column (1), the 
introduction of the law reduces the number of meth-labs by 42%. The inclusion of 
county FE and all controls moves the estimates to -38%. Coefficients are 
precisely estimated with a significance level below 1%.  
My point estimates are almost identical to those of Dobkin et al. (2014). In 
particular, they show that the reduction was large for labs with capacity less than 
two ounces and for labs with capacity between two and eight ounces at 
approximately 32% and 54%. For the largest labs the reduction was 22%, not 
significant at the 5 percent level.83  
II. A Test for the Systemic Violence Hypothesis 
The exit from the market of a multitude of meth-producers controlling low and 
medium capacity labs might have reduced the competition among drug dealers. 
This might have lowered the systemic violence associated with the sale of crystal 
methamphetamines. This dynamic might in part explain the drop in murders and 
aggravated assaults, detected in the first part of the paper.  
I test this hypothesis analyzing the impact of OTC restrictions on 1) arrests for 
sale of “Other Dangerous non Narcotics”, the FBI category including crystal 
                                                
83  Dobkin et al. (2014) estimated a 25% reduction in the domestic production of methamphetamines.  
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methamphetamines and 2) the number of homicides that occurred in 
circumstances related to gangs violence and illegal drug trafficking. For both 
specifications I use estimating equation (2).  
Table IX, column (1) reports the results with outcome variable being arrests 
for sale of other dangerous non-narcotics.  
[Table IX] 
This specification includes county FE, year FE and all county observables. 
While the effect is negative but highly insignificant in the year 2005, I detect a 
23% reduction in the 2006. This coefficient is significant at the 10% level.84  
Despite the sharp reduction in the arrests for other dangerous non-narcotics, 
plausibly due to the drop in the domestic production of crystal methamphetamines 
and to the exit from the market of segments of unspecialized consumers/dealers, 
no significant change is detected on the violence associated with drug trafficking 
(expressed by homicides due to narcotic drug offense, gangland killings and 
juvenile gangs killings). 
Table X shows all the FBI categories of circumstances that lead to murders, 
number of episodes for the period spanning 2001 to 2006 and relative frequency.  
[Table X] 
I grouped homicide circumstances in 5 broader crime categories: 1) theft, 2) 
sex, 3) gangs and drug trafficking, 4) brawls and violent altercations and 5) 
crimes due to negligence. As in the preceding analysis, I use the estimating 
equation (2).  Results are shown in table XI.  
                                                
84 This result is robust to the inclusion of states-specific linear trends, with a coefficient of -30% in 2006, 
with an associated significance level below 5%. Results, omitted for brevity purpose only, are available upon 
request. 
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[Table XI] 
I detect a reduction of 8.2% for murders connected to brawls and violent 
altercations in the year 2005. This coefficient is significant at the 10% level. No 
significant effect is detected on other homicide circumstances.  
Overall, this analysis suggests that the reduction in violent crimes due to OTC 
restrictions do not seem to be driven by a reduction in the systemic violence, 
typically associated with the production/distribution of illegal drugs. This 
corroborates the ethnographic evidence on the segmentation of this market: 
extreme abusers decide to produce to have a cheaper access to the substance, 
rather then to extract profits from it.  
This analysis – instead – supports the medical evidence on the violence 
enhancing effects of crystal-meth. OTC restrictions have reduced the episodes of 
violent altercations terminated with murder. These episodes might happen with 
higher probability when the offender is under the influence of this powerful 
neurotoxic drug (McKetin et al., 2014). 
III. Geographical Spillovers Across Borders 
I now investigate the presence of unintended consequences of OTC 
restrictions. This might be connected with the possible geographical relocation of 
meth production and associated criminal activity across states-borders. This 
hypothesis is tested using the following estimating equation: 
 
𝑦!,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! + (𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡  )!""#!!!""# 𝛽! + 𝜀!,!,!                    (5) 
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I restrict this quasi-experimental design to counties belonging to CMEA Only 
states. I assign an indicator variable bordering=1 to counties sharing the borders 
with states that adopted an OTC regulation in 2005. I assign the value bordering 
= 0 to non-bordering counties.  Other details are identical to regression (1). 
Results are shown in table XII-A.  
 
[Tables XII (A-B)] 
Each column reports the results of the same specification for each different 
outcome, respectively: meth-labs seizures, larceny, burglary, aggravated assault 
and murder. I do not detect any significant effect on meth-labs seizures nor in 
criminal activity.  
I then repeat the same exercise adopting a more flexible identification strategy. 
I use the distance of each control county to the closest treated county as 
continuous treatment intensity.85 This leads to the following estimating equation:  
 
𝑦!,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! + (𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  )!""#!!!""# 𝛽! + 𝜀!,!,!                    (6) 
 
Results are shown in table XII-B. No significant effect is detected. This 
evidence, suggests that the crime reduction is not driven by a relocation of meth-
production and criminal activity in control states, but rather by an effective drop 
in treated states.  
                                                
85 The matrix of distances between all counties can be freely accessed at the NBER page at the following 
link: http://www.nber.org/data/county-distance-database.html  
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IV. Drugs-Related Arrests 
I now analyze the effects of OTC restrictions on the arrests for sale and 
possession of illegal drugs. This section investigates whether the drop in crime 
might be in part due to a specific effort of authorities in pursuing meth-abusers. 
Moreover, it also investigates the presence of potential spillovers across 
substances. OTC restrictions might have shifted both the demand and/or the 
supply-side towards other illegal substances.   
 The FBI categorizes drugs-related arrests in 4 different groups: other-
dangerous non-narcotics (the category including crystal methamphetamines), 
synthetics narcotics (manufactured narcotics that can cause true drug addiction), 
marijuana and cocaine, opium and derivatives. Results, obtained using the event-
study specification as in regression (2) are shown in table XIII-A (sale) and XIII-
B (possession). 
[Table XIII (A-B)] 
No significant effect is detected in arrests for sale. The analysis of the 
coefficients nevertheless suggests a reduction for arrests of synthetics narcotics, 
after the enactment of the reform.86 Table XIII-B reports the results for arrests for 
possession. Again, no significant coefficient is detected. Note that in 2005 we 
observe a coefficient of 0.12 with an associated p-value of 18% for the arrests of 
other dangerous non-narcotics. I further explore the relevance of this channel by 
including arrests for possession of other dangerous non-narcotics as a control 
variable in estimating equation (1). Results of the coefficient treat*post are 
                                                
 86 This might be the case because several FBI agencies report the arrests for sale of methamphetamines in 
this category, rather then in the category of other dangerous non-narcotics. For example, CJIC collects drug 
arrest data submitted by police departments in Michigan who use the Michigan Incident Crime Reporting 
system (MICR).  There are specific arrest codes for methamphetamine crimes.  Michigan file class codes for 
possession arrests include the categories Methamphetamine Possession, Synthetic Narcotic (Other), and 
Synthetic Narcotic Possession.  Synthetic Narcotic (Other) and Synthetic Narcotic Possession charges may 
include other drugs than methamphetamine that are synthetically manufactured, including MDMA (Ecstasy) 
and amphetamines (Michigan state police, 2007). 
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essentially identical to those obtained in the baseline specification. Overall, this 
analysis seems to indicate that the police crackdown on meth-users might be a 
factor in the reduction of criminal activity, but it is unlikely to explain it single 
handily.87  
V. Summary of the Potential Mechanisms 
The analysis of this section has provided the following insights: 1) OTC 
restrictions led to estimated 38% drop in the number of meth-labs, mainly driven 
by a reduction on small-medium capacity labs; 2) a decline in murders due to 
violent altercations, but no effect on homicides due to systemic violence; 3) no 
strong sign of relocation of criminal activity across borders, substitution in the 
demand or supply of other illegal substances, crackdown of police on meth-
abusers. 
VI. A Theoretical Framework 
OTC restrictions, de facto, represent a price shock to segments of extreme 
abusers. Before the policy intervention they had access to crystal 
methamphetamines at low prices. This is either because they were meth-
producers or because the substance was manufactured within their close network 
of acquaintances.  
From a theoretical perspective, the impact of OTC regulations on crime is 
ex-ante ambiguous. 1) It could have led to an upsurge of appropriative crimes (as 
well as of violent crimes) committed by extreme drugs-addict to compensate for 
the increase in the cost of addiction. 2) An increase in prices – by negatively 
affecting consumption and potentially generating “cold turkey” episodes for 
                                                
87 Results are available upon request. 
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extreme abusers – might have reduced the proliferation of property crimes, 
(related to the need to support addiction or to foster small quantity productions), 
and/or both property and violent crimes (committed under the influence of this 
powerful substance). 
        In this section I propose a simple theoretical dynamic framework. This not 
only highlights the existence of the above-discussed tradeoff, but also aims at 
sharpening the interpretation of the empirical results. In fact, the model provides a 
further set of predictions. These are formally tested or explored using additional 
qualitative evidence.  
VII. The Model 
I set the model up to capture the qualitative features of the domestic market of 
crystal methamphetamines. I analyze the decision process of a typical “meth-
head” hit by OTC restrictions.  
I focus on a representative agent who has an initial stock of addiction 𝑆!. The 
agent lives two periods: period 1 (pre-OTC restrictions) and period 2 (post-OTC 
restrictions). Each period, the agent decides how much crystal-methamphetamine 
to consume 𝑀  – either by producing or by buying it – and how much crime to 
commit 𝐶 .  
For tractability purpose, I assume that the agent commits crime only to get the 
money to sustain his drug habit and/or to foster the illegal production process. 
The budget constraint has the following form: 
 𝑝!𝑀! = 𝐶! 
 
Here p is the price of crystal methamphetamines and 𝑡 = 1,2 indexes the time 
period. Consistently with ethnographic and DEA evidence about the typical 
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extreme meth-addict who turned into a producer, I do not embed a profit 
maximization problem within this theoretical framework. That is, the agent only 
cares about using the substance and needs to commit theft crimes in order to “get 
high”. 
A linear disutility is associated with committing criminal activity. There is a 
positive probability of apprehension from law-enforcement agencies: 𝜋! = 𝜋! =𝜋 ∈ 0,1 .  
 
Assumption 1: 𝑆! > !! 𝑝! + 𝛿𝐸 𝑝! + 𝑝!  
 
Here 𝛿 ∈ 0,1  is the agent’s discount factor and 𝐸 𝑝!  is date 1 forecast of 
date 2 prices. Assumption 1, while ensuring non-negative consumption and crime 
in both periods, captures the idea that the agent has a sufficiently high level of 
addiction. The agent hence may commit crime to finance his consumption.  
In period 1 the agent suffers a quadratic loss when his consumption 𝑀!  
deviates from his initial level of addiction (𝑆!): 
 𝑈! = − 𝑀! − 𝑆! ! − 𝜋𝐶! 
 
The choice of consumption in period 1 (𝑀!)  affects the decision problem in 
period 2. The agents suffers a disutility that equals the quadratic distance between 
consumption across the two periods: 
 𝑈! = − 𝑀! −𝑀! ! − 𝜋𝐶!. 
 
Assumption 2: The agent is not perfectly forward looking (i.e. OTC 
restrictions represent an unexpected price shock to heavy users). 
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Assumption 2 emphasizes how meth users developed their addiction before the 
period 1 reform. That is, when consuming and building up their habit, they did 
not internalize the possibility that prices would have dramatically increased in the 
future. 
I explore the merits of assumption 2 using data on prices and purities of crystal 
methamphetamines. These are obtained from a public report “The Price and 
Purity of Illicit Drugs” (2008) of the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) for the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Price and purity estimates are 
derived from records in the STRIDE database. This is maintained by the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA).88 
[Figure 10] 
Data on methamphetamines are expressed per pure gram for three different 
weight categories, highlighting three different levels in the illegal-drug 
distributional chain (0.1 – 10g, 10 – 100g and >100g). Quarterly prices in 2007 
US dollars are aggregated at the national level. 
Figure 10 reveals an interesting pattern on the evolution of prices of crystal 
methamphetamines (top panel). The vertical line represents the 3rd quarter 2005, 
when 70% of Early Adopters stated enacted OTC restrictions. Relative to the 
second quarter of 2005, the price for 1 gram of methamphetamines in quantities 
below 10 grams rose by 108%. The price for quantities between 10 – 100 grams 
rose by 70%.  The price for quantities exceeding 100 grams rose by 55%.89,90  
                                                
88 The document, the data and the technical appendix describing the sampling and the manipulation 
procedure used are all public available at the following web page: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/bullet_1.pdf  
89  Further evidence is provided by ethnographic studies. Lopez (2014) interviewed 38 meth-users 
women convicted in Missouri. Nearly half of the women suggested that it became more difficult to purchase 
and manufacture meth as a result of OTC restrictions: “when I was cooking anhydrous dope, we were doing 
[cooking] from 14, 15, 16 ounces at a time. Nowadays, people might make three or four grams at a time.” 
This sometimes meant that the women would cook more frequently, even daily, which of course increased 
their risk of detection. The precursor restrictions also meant that women found it increasingly difficult to find 
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I solve the model recursively, giving the following optimal amounts of 
methamphetamines consumption and crime in the two periods: 
 
Period 1  (Pre-Reform) 
 𝑀!∗ = 𝑆! − 𝜋 𝑝! + 𝛿𝐸 𝑝!2𝐶!∗ = 𝑝! 𝑆! − 𝜋 𝑝! + 𝛿𝐸 𝑝!2  
 
Period 2  (Post-Reform) 
 𝑀!∗ = 𝑆! − 𝜋2 𝑝! + 𝛿𝐸 𝑝! + 𝑝!𝐶!∗ = 𝑝! 𝑆! − 𝜋2 𝑝! + 𝛿𝐸 𝑝! + 𝑝!  
 
Proposition 1: An increase in meth-prices monotonically decreases its 
consumption. 
 
Proof: By inspection, 
                                                                                                                                
methamphetamine for their own use. The women in the sample, despite heavy drug use and involvement in 
other crimes, were in many cases “restrictively deterred”. Though they all eventually were caught, the 
women made strategic moves—reducing or changing their involvement—to try and reduce their likelihood of 
arrest and severe punishment. Some of them also made the decision to quit using prior to arrest, though 
typically for other reasons.  
Similar evidence is found in Sexton et al. (2008). Some of the meth users in their sample agreed that the 
laws had restricted the illicit availability of PSE as well as meth production in their communities during the 
first year of their implementation. At the same time, while many of these respondents had decreased their use 
and production of methamphetamine at the follow-up, they attributed these decreases to other factors (e.g., 
personal, health and family problems related to meth use) and not directly to the new laws (Sexton et al., 
2008).  
90 The graphical analysis also suggests a response in the production, showing a more homogeneous drop 
of around 35-40% in the purity of the substance in the same time frame. The plot of prices and purity of 
crack-cocaine (figure XIII-A bottom panel), heroin and powder cocaine (figure XIII-B) does not reveal any 
significant pattern for these drugs.  
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𝜕𝑀!𝜕𝑝! < 0, 𝑡 = 1,2  ∎ 
 
This model also captures the existence of a non-monotonic effect of a change 
in prices on criminal behavior. 
 
Proposition 2: The effect of an increase in meth prices on criminal activity 
exhibits an inverse U-Relationship with respect to the price level.  
 
In period 2 it can be shown that: 91 
 𝜕𝐶!𝜕𝑝! > 0⟺ 𝑝! < 𝑝!𝜕𝐶!𝜕𝑝! ≤ 0⟺ 𝑝! ≥ 𝑝! 
Where:      𝑝! = 2𝑆! − 𝜋 𝑝! + 𝛿𝐸𝑝!2𝜋  
 
Proof: Direct differentiation.  ∎  
 
A rise in meth prices makes addiction more expensive. Below 𝑝! this leads to 
an increase in criminal behavior. The expected marginal cost from crime is 
“somewhat acceptable” and it is less than the expected benefit deriving from meth 
consumption. Conversely, above 𝑝! the price of addiction becomes “too-high”. 
This discourages criminal activity because the expected costs deriving from it 
exceeds its expected benefits.  
                                                
91 A similar reasoning applies for period 1. 
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Note that an increase in the initial level of addiction (𝑆!) pushes 𝑝! to the 
right: an extreme addict will resist more to an increase in prices before reducing 
his level of criminal activity. The opposite argument applies for an increase in the 
probability of apprehension 𝜋. This decreases the threshold-price 𝑝!. Finally, an 
increase in 𝑝!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐸(𝑝!) will push the threshold to the left, by reducing meth 
consumption in period 1. This will indirectly produce less desire for the drug in 
the subsequent period, reducing criminal behavior. Proposition 3 offers the last 
theoretical prediction of the model. 
 
Proposition 3:  ∀  𝑆!  ∃  𝑝!  𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡  𝑝!   >   𝑝!     ⟹   𝐶!∗ < 𝐶!∗  
 
Proof: 
 
 𝐶!∗ > 𝐶!  ∗    Implies that: 
 𝜋𝑝!! + 𝑝! 𝜋 𝑝! + 𝛿𝐸 𝑝! − 2𝑆! +   𝑝! 2𝑆! − 𝜋 𝑝! + 𝛿𝐸 𝑝! ≤ 0 
 
With 𝜋 > 0 it is trivial to show that proposition 3 holds where the vertex of the 
parabola is below or above zero.∎  
 
This proposition highlights the possibility of heterogeneous and non-
monotonic effects of the laws via a change in meth-prices. It also ensures that – 
independently from the initial level of addiction – there will always be a realized 
price 𝑝!  above the threshold p!   for which criminal activity in period 2 (post-
regulation) falls below the level of criminal activity in period 1 (pre-regulation).  
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VIII. From the Model to the Data 
This section explores and tests the empirical implications derived from the 
theoretical predictions of the model.  
 
Testable Implication 1:  OTC restrictions reduced meth-consumption.  
 
A major drawback for this study is the lack of data on crystal-meth 
consumption. Nevertheless, figure 11 shows two informative separate pieces of 
descriptive evidence. 
                                                            [Figure 11] 
The left-hand figure shows trends of lifetime prevalence of crystal 
methamphetamines use in a population of 12th graders in the United States. Data 
is obtained from “Monitoring the Future” an ongoing study of the behaviors, 
attitudes, and values of American secondary school students, college students, 
and young adults. Each year, a total of approximately 50,000 8th, 10th and 12th 
grade students are surveyed. We observe a drop in crystal-methamphetamines 
lifetime prevalence of almost 30% from 2004 to 2005.  
On the right hand side, I plot data from Drug Testing Index Archives of Quest 
Diagnostics, the largest provider of workplace drug tests in the US.92 We observe 
a reduction of 15.2% in 2005 and 35.7% in 2006 with respect to the year 2004. 
The official documentation of Quest Diagnostics further corroborates Testable 
Implication 1: 
 
 
                                                
             92 Freely available at http://www.questdiagnostics.com/home/physicians/health-trends/drug-
testing/archives.html  
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“Methamphetamine, the most commonly abused type of amphetamine, 
increased in production and trafficking during the 1990’s to become the most 
prevalent illegally manufactured synthetic drug in the United States. Analysis of 
the Quest Diagnostics Drug Testing Index, released semi-annually, suggests that 
efforts to reduce illicit, clandestine production of methamphetamine may be 
having an impact on workplace positive tests for the drug”. 93 
 
The theoretical model – rather then focusing on the behavior of a low-
frequency user – is built to analyze the decision process of segments of extreme 
abusers. These should have curbed the intensive/extensive margin of consumption, 
not without experiencing any physical or mental difficulty. This premise leads to 
testable implication 2. 
 
Testable Implication 2: OTC restrictions, by decreasing the 
intensive/extensive margin of consumption of extreme-abusers, have generated 
“cold turkey” episodes, meth-hospitalization due: to rehabilitation, detoxification 
and withdrawal symptoms. 
 
I formally test this hypothesis using the Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS). 
This database is maintained by the Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and 
Quality, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA). The TEDS system includes state level records for some 1.5 million 
substance abuse treatment admissions annually. While TEDS does not represent 
the total national demand for substance abuse treatment, it contains a significant 
proportion of all admissions to substance abuse treatment. These are voluntary 
admissions for detoxification, rehabilitation and ambulatory.  
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I use an estimating equation similar to equation (1). TEDS data and all 
socioeconomic controls are at the state-year level. Table XIV presents separate 
results for hospitalizations due to meth, alcohol, heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and 
amphetamines.  
[Tables XIV] 
Corroborating Testable Implication 2, I detect an increase of 34% for 
hospitalizations due to methamphetamines. This is significant at the 5% level. 
The effect is isolated only to crystal methamphetamines. No effect is detected on 
hospitalizations due to abuse of alcohol or other illegal substances. 
I also use evidence from The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN). This 
provides nationally representative patient demographic and visit-level information 
on emergency department (ED) visits. These visits can result from: substance 
misuse or abuse, adverse reactions to drugs taken as prescribed or directed, 
accidental ingestion of drugs, drug-related suicide attempts, and admissions for 
detox.  
 [Figure 12] 
Figure 12 shows national level data from 2004 to 2007. While we observe a 
general decrease in ED treatment throughout the US (top figure), we notice a peak 
in 2005 for emergency treatments for detox (+31% with respect to the pre-reform 
year in 2004). We also observe an increase in both 2005 and 2006 in emergency 
treatments due to suicides attempts connected with methamphetamine use. This is 
a condition medically associated with meth withdrawal (+20% in 2005 and +6.5% 
in 2006 with respect to year 2004). 
 
Testable Implication 3:  OTC restrictions produce heterogeneous and non-
monotonic (negative or positive) effects on criminal activity. 
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I investigate the presence of potential heterogeneous impacts of the laws across 
US states. I estimate a regression of the following type: 
𝑦!,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! + (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑! ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡  )!"!!! 𝛽! + 𝜀!,!,!                    (7) 
I show the results of this specification in figure XI only for larceny and murder. 
I plot 30 states-specific coefficients obtained from a regression that interacts the 
variable “Post” with each state dummy.94  
 [Figure 13] 
Figure 13 top-panel shows the plot of the coefficients for larceny and murder 
for each of the 30 treated states. This figure shows heterogeneous effects on both 
property and violent crimes. Four US states have seen a positive and significant 
effect on larceny due to OTC restrictions (Indiana, Missouri, Montana, Virginia, 
West Virginia) with Alabama, Louisiana and Hawaii displaying the top reduction. 
Three states display a significant increase in homicides (Arkansas, Delaware and 
Hawaii). 
It is extremely difficult to investigate the specific causes behind this 
heterogeneity in the impact. I do an initial attempt plotting the same coefficients 
obtained from this regression (y-axis) and the log of the number of 
hospitalizations due to meth-abuse (figure 13 bottom panel). The graph shows 
negative correlations between the estimated coefficients and the normalized 
measure of predetermined meth-abuse at the state-level. This evidence suggests 
that the reduction in criminal activity is stronger in US states with a higher pre-
determined concentration of extreme meth-addicts. Acknowledging the possible 
ambiguity of the impact on crime it is of absolute importance. Deepening the 
                                                
94 I impose equal to zero all the interactions between “Post” and the 8 dummy variables of each control 
state. Results on all other crimes are qualitatively similar. Tables are omitted for brevity considerations only 
and are available upon request. 
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understanding of this heterogeneity represents a promising direction for future 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Meth-Labs Seized in the United States, By Year 
 
                 NOTES: This Figure shows the number of meth labs seized by law-
enforcement agencies in all the United States, from 2004 to 2006. Source: 
(DEA, 2012). 
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Figure 10: Meth and Crack-Cocaine Prices and Purity 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of prices and estimated purities for crystal 
methamphetamines and crack cocaine. Data are obtained from the public report “The Price and 
Purity of Illicit Drugs” (2008) of the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) for the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). All price and purity estimates were derived from 
records in the STRIDE database maintained by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 
Data on prices and purity are expressed per pure gram of the substance for different weight 
categories, summarizing the different prices for different levels in the illegal-drug distribution 
chain. Prices are expressed in 2007 US dollars, are reported on a quarterly basis and are 
aggregated at the national level. The first vertical line signals the 4th quarter of 2004. The second 
vertical line signals the 3rd quarter of 2005 when 70% of early adopters states enacted an internal 
OTC restriction. 
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Figure 11: Crystal Meth Consumption 
 
  Notes: The top panel shows Regional Trends In Methamphetamines Reported per 
100,000 people aged 15 and older. Source DEA (2014). The bottom panel shows the 
pattern of crystal meth consumption: lifetime prevalence (left-side) and work drug test 
(right-side). Sources: Monitoring the Future (University of Michigan) and Quest 
Diagnostics 
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Figure 12: Meth-Related Emergency Hospitalizations 
 
 
 
Notes: Source is the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN). DAWN is a public health 
surveillance system that monitors drug-related emergency department (ED) visits in the United 
States and is a source for monitoring methamphetamine use. DAWN offers a unique perspective by 
examining use severe enough to warrant an ED visit. To be a DAWN case, the ED visit must have 
involved a drug, either as the direct cause of the visit or as a contributing factor
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Figure 13: Heterogeneity of the Impact of OTC Restrictions, By US State 
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   Notes: The top panel of this figure shows the plot of the 30 coefficients  estimated using    
regression (7). The bottom panel correlates these coefficients with the state-level measure of meth-
related hospitalizations in 2004. 
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TABLE VIII  
The Effect of OTC Restrictions on Meth-Labs Seizures  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Baseline + County FE + County 
Observables 
    
Treated * Post -0.417*** -0.420*** -0.380*** 
 (0.0796) (0.0795) (0.0672) 
    
Observations 4,846 4,846 4,829 
R-squared 0.281 0.133 0.142 
Year FE 
State FE 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
County FE NO YES YES 
County Observables NO NO YES 
Number of counties 1,625 1,625 1,623 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. The level of observation is 
county – year. This table reports the results of a difference in differences specification. The outcome 
variable is the number of meth-labs seized by law enforcement agencies and it expressed as ln(1+x) 
where x is the number of labs per 100,000 inhabitants. Data on labs are available from 2004 onwards. 
I interact the variable treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has 
regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals) with the POST dummy (years 2005 
and 2006). I consider as control counties, counties in States that only adopted the CMEA federal law 
(the last provision of the law took effect the 30th of September 2006. Column 1 shows the results for the 
baseline specification, when I include year FE and state FE. In column 2 I add to the baseline 
specification county FE. In column 3 I include all county observables.  
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TABLE IX 
Testing for Reduction in Systemic Violence 
 (1) (3) 
 Arrests for Sale 
Other Dangerous non 
Narcotics 
Homicides due to 
Gangs and Systemic 
Violence 
   
Treated * 2001 -0.409*** -0.0487 
 (0.127) (0.0396) 
 
Treated * 2002 -0.156 0.0128 
 (0.116) (0.00760) 
 
Treated * 2003 -0.000811 -0.00438 
 (0.0789) (0.0111) 
 
 
Treated * 2005 
 
-0.0423 
 
-0.00794 
 (0.101) (0.0156) 
 
Treated * 2006 -0.230* 0.00247 
 (0.114) (0.0141) 
   
Observations 9,664 9,664 
R-squared 0.051 0.002 
Number of fips 1,625 1,625 
Year FE YES YES 
County FE YES YES 
County 
Observables 
YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. I use estimating equation (2). 
I interact the variable treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has 
regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a 
state where only CMEA was implemented) with a dummy for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006). The omitted category is the interaction between treated and the dummy for the year 
2004 (the year before the enactment of the states laws. I also include county FE, year FE and all 
county observables. Outcomes are arrests for sale of other dangerous non-narcotics (column 1) and 
homicides due to gangs and systemic violence (column 2). 
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TABLE X – Homicides Circumstances 
Type of Crime Frequency Percent 
   Theft-Crimes 
   
Robbery 6,747 6.61 
Burglary 567 0.56 
Larceny 103 0.1 
Motor vehicle theft 160 0.16 
   Sex-Crimes 
   
Rape 287 0.28 
Prostitution and commercialized vice 67 0.07 
Other sex offense 76 0.07 
Lovers triangle 722 0.71 
   Gangs & Drug Trafficking Crimes 
   
Narcotic drug offense 4,189 4.1 
Gangland killings 614 0.6 
Juvenile gang killings 5,454 5.34 
   Violent Crimes 
   
Brawl due to influence of alcohol 892 0.87 
Brawl due to influence of narcotics 535 0.52 
Argument over money or property 1,357 1.33 
Other arguments 24,871 24.35 
   Crime due to Negligence 
   
Gun-cleaning death - other than self 9 0.01 
Children playing with gun 127 0.12 
Other negligent handling of gun 328 0.32 
All other manslaughter by negligence 612 0.6 
Note: This table reports the number and relative frequency of homicides divided by 
specific circumstances under which these occurred. Source NAJCD 2001-2006. 
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TABLE XI: Difference in Differences 
Homicides Circumstances 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Theft Sex Violent 
Altercations 
Negligence 
     
Treated * 2001 0.0440** 0.0200 -0.0798** 0.00172 
 (0.0193) (0.0228) (0.0353) (0.0125) 
 
Treated * 2002 0.000848 0.0293* 0.00611 -0.0163 
 (0.0251) (0.0145) (0.0406) (0.0151) 
 
Treated * 2003 0.0442* 0.0192 -0.00562 0.0115 
 (0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0620) (0.0133) 
 
 
Treated * 2005 
 
0.00424 
 
0.0124 
 
-0.0822** 
 
0.0102 
 (0.0200) (0.0171) (0.0383) (0.0130) 
 
Treated * 2006 -0.0334 0.000436 0.0167 -0.00411 
 (0.0308) (0.0142) (0.0280) (0.00811) 
     
Observations 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 
R-squared 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Number of counties 1,625 1,625 1,625 1,625 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard    
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. I use estimating equation (2). I interact the 
variable treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the 
provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it belongs to a state where only CMEA 
was implemented) with a dummy for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). The omitted category 
is the interaction between treated and the dummy for the year 2004 (the year before the enactment of the 
states laws. Outcome variables are all expressed as ln(1+x), where x is the crime measure normalized  per 
100,000 inhabitants. I also include county FE, year FE and all county observables. Outcomes are homicides 
in the following circumstances: gangs-related homicide, theft, sex, violent altercation and negligence. 
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TABLE XII-A 
Geographical Spillovers in Control States: Binary Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Meth-
Labs 
Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
      
Border County * Post 0.0503 -0.0300 -0.0457 -0.00923 0.0857 
 (0.0669) (0.0323) (0.0362) (0.0498) (0.103) 
      
Observations 414 827 827 827 827 
R-squared 0.069 0.037 0.074 0.049 0.039 
Number of counties 138 138 138 138 138 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors, 
reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the county level. The level of observation is county – year. This table 
reports the results of a difference in differences specification for meth-labs seizures, larceny, Burglary Assault and 
Murder. I focus exclusively on counties in control states. I use the interaction of the variable "Border County” (a 
dummy taking the value 1 if the county shares the border with a treated state and 0 otherwise) with the “POST” 
dummy (years 2005 and 2006. The specification include year FE, state FE and all county observables. The sample 
goes from 2001 to 2006 included (2004-2006 for meth-labs seizures). 
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TABLE XII-B 
Geographical Spillovers in Control States: Continuous Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Meth-
Labs 
Larceny Burglary Assault Murder 
      
Post * Distance to Closer Border -0.0116 0.0150 0.0188 0.0237 -0.0300 
 (0.0354) (0.0136) (0.0168) (0.0230) (0.0434) 
      
Observations 414 827 827 827 827 
R-squared 0.067 0.037 0.074 0.051 0.039 
Number of counties 138 138 138 138 138 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors, reported in 
parenthesis, are clustered at the county level. The level of observation is county – year. This table reports the results of a 
difference in differences specification for meth-labs seizures, larceny, Burglary Assault and Murder. I focus exclusively on 
counties in control states. I use the interaction of the variable "Distance to closer border” (the distance in miles of each 
county to the closest county in a treated state) with the “POST” dummy (years 2005 and 2006. The specification include year 
FE, state FE and all county observables. The sample goes from 2001 to 2006 included (2004-2006 for meth-labs seizures). 
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TABLE XIII-A 
 Arrests for Sale 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Synthetics Marijuana Cocaine 
    
Treated * 2001 -0.240 -0.308** -0.133 
 (0.162) (0.136) (0.104) 
    
Treated * 2002 0.0411 -0.128 0.00173 
 (0.115) (0.0806) (0.0712) 
 
Treated * 2003 0.0334 0.0732 0.0566 
 (0.105) (0.0683) (0.0559) 
 
 
Treated * 2005 
 
-0.0957 
 
-0.0703 
 
-0.0707 
 (0.0728) (0.0599) (0.0762) 
    
Treated * 2006 -0.202 0.0214 -0.0541 
 (0.128) (0.108) (0.0801) 
    
Observations 9,664 9,664 9,664 
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.020 
Number of counties 1,625 1,625 1,625 
Year FE YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES 
      Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. The level of observation 
is county – year. This table reports the results of the difference in differences specification with a 
different outcome for each column. Using the FBI categorization I include arrests for sale of 
Other Dangerous non-narcotics (the FBI Category including Meth) synthetic Narcotics 
(manufactured narcotics that can cause true drug addiction), Marijuana and Cocaine, Opium or 
Derivatives. Outcome variables are expressed as ln(1+x) where x is the relevant measure per 
100,000 inhabitants. I interact the variable treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county 
belongs to a state that has regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals) 
with a dummy for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). The omitted category is the 
interaction between treated and the dummy for the year 2004 (the year before the enactment of 
the states laws).  I include year FE, county FE and all county observables 
 
 
 
 
 129 
 
TABLE XIII-B 
Arrests for possession 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Other Synthetics Marijuana Cocaine 
     
Treated * 2001 -0.276 -0.211 -0.307* -0.283*** 
 (0.211) (0.176) (0.158) (0.100) 
 
Treated * 2002 0.0408 -0.0698 -0.0311 -0.0708 
 (0.175) (0.135) (0.0627) (0.0802) 
 
Treated * 2003 -0.00574 -0.230* 0.0290 -0.112* 
 (0.0759) (0.132) (0.0549) (0.0650) 
 
 
Treated * 2005 
 
0.125 
 
-0.0171 
 
0.0681 
 
-0.0291 
 (0.0861) (0.0820) (0.0664) (0.0618) 
 
Treated * 2006 -0.0818 -0.141 0.0577 0.104 
 (0.136) (0.101) (0.0640) (0.115) 
     
Observations 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 
R-squared 0.099 0.068 0.026 0.056 
Number of counties 1,625 1,625 1,625 1,625 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
County Observables YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard 
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. The level of observation is county – year. 
This table reports the results of the difference in differences specification with a different outcome for 
each column. Using the FBI categorization I include arrests for possession of Other Dangerous non-
narcotics (the FBI Category including Meth) synthetic Narcotics (manufactured narcotics that can cause 
true drug addiction), Marijuana and Cocaine, Opium or Derivatives. Outcome variables are expressed 
as ln(1+x) where x is the relevant measure per 100,000 inhabitants. I interact the variable treated (a 
dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the provision of 
methamphetamine precursors chemicals) with a dummy for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006). The omitted category is the interaction between treated and the dummy for the year 2004 (the year 
before the enactment of the states laws).  I include year FE, county FE and all county observables. 
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TABLE XIV 
TEDS Hospitalizations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Meth Alcohol Heroin Cocaine Marijuana Ampheta
mines 
       
Treated * Post 0.341** 0.0317 0.000987 -0.0118 0.0669 -0.0555 
 (0.160) (0.0409) (0.0863) (0.0900) (0.0475) (0.187) 
       
Observations 224 224 224 224 224 224 
R-squared 0.324 0.104 0.117 0.171 0.102 0.071 
Number of states 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
STATE FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State Observables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors, reported in 
parenthesis, are clustered at the State level. The level of observation is state – year. This table reports the results of a 
difference in differences specification for hospitalizations due to: meth, alcohol, heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and 
amphetamines. The sample goes from 2001 to 2006 included. Treated*Post is the interaction of the variable treated (a dummy 
taking the value of 1 if the state has regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals in 2005 and 0 if it 
belongs to a state where only CMEA was implemented) with Post (a dummy that takes the value of 1 for 2005 and 2006 and 0 
otherwise).  
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Chapter V – Drugs and Crime in the US: IV Design and Other Results 
By ROCCO D’ESTE 
This final chapter aims to estimate the elasticity of crime to meth-labs. I use a 
combination of diff-in-diff and IV designs. First, I present the baseline empirical strategy 
and related results. Then, I discuss potential threats to identification, proposing and 
implementing alternative approaches. These aim to reduce concerns related to the 
violation of the exclusion restriction. Finally, I present: i) an additional DD design 
exploiting a subsequent federal act, ii) the examination of the long-run effects of OTC 
restrictions. 
 
 
I. An Instrumental Variable Design 
 In this section I address the endogenous entry/exit or opening/closing of meth-labs. I 
use states’ OTC restriction as an instrumental variable for the county-level measure of 
meth-labs. This is approximated by law-enforcement seizures. Equation (9) shows the 
first stage regression. Equation (8) reports the two-stage least squares estimating 
equation: 
 
Two stage least squares: 
 𝑦!,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! +𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ_𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑠!,!,!𝛽! + 𝜀!,!,!                                          (8) 
 
First stage: 
 𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ_𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑠!,!,! = 𝛾! + 𝜂! + 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! + 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝛽! + 𝜁!,!,!      (9) 
 
Data on meth-labs seizures are available from 2004. I limit the analysis from 2004 to 
2006. The instrument is the interaction of the treated dummy and the dummy post (which 
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is 0 in 2004 and 1 in 2005 and 2006). Reported crimes and meth-labs are expressed as 𝑙𝑛 1+ 𝑥 . Here 𝑥  is the relevant variable expressed per 100,000 inhabitants. The 
baseline specification includes state FE rather than county FE, due to the availability of 
only three years of data. County FE are added in the subsequent robustness check. Socio-
economic controls are also included. 
 
[Table XV] 
Results of the first stage regression are reported in table XV column (1). The sign of 
the instrument is negative as expected (-41%), significant at the 1% level. The F-statistic 
on the excluded instrument has a value of 104.5. 
 Tables XVI-A and XVI-B report the results of the OLS and IV specifications. Table 
XVI-A reports the results on theft crimes (larceny, burglary and motor-vehicle thefts). 
Table XVI-B reports the results for violent crimes (murder, aggravated assaults and 
rapes).  
 [Tables XVI (A-B)] 
For property crimes, the elasticity on larceny and burglary is 0.25 and 0.3 significant, 
in both cases, at the 1% level. The elasticity of motor-vehicle thefts is 0.11 with a p-value 
of 13%. For violent crimes, I detect an elasticity of 0.34 for rape, 0.18 for assault and 
0.36 for murder. All these coefficients are precisely estimated at the 1% or 5% 
significance level.  
 
II. Potential Threats to Identification Via IV Design 
The close inspection of the coefficients shows that IV estimates are three to five times 
larger than OLS for both violent and property crimes. The only exception is murder. IV 
estimates are 30 times larger than OLS.  
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Discussion 
 
Part of this gap could be rationalized by idiosyncratic and systematic measurement 
error. This inevitably derives from using meth-labs seizures as a proxy for the underlying 
covert production of methamphetamines. Measurement error generates attenuation bias in 
the OLS estimates. Chalfin and McCrary (2014) present evidence on the importance of 
this issue in the basic dataset on police used in the U.S. literature, the Uniform Crime 
Reports (UCR). They show that prior regression-based estimates are too small by a factor 
of four or five.95 This is consistent with the results included in this section. 
 The IV design estimates the local average treatment effect (LATE) rather than the 
average treatment effect (ATE). Hence, LATE > ATE might suggest that OTC restriction 
targeted significantly more low-quantity labs. These were run by segments of extreme 
abusers that – before regulations – were plausibly responsible for a great deal of criminal 
activity.96 
The validity of the identifying assumption relies on the absence of any effect of the 
instrument on the outcome running through some omitted variable. OTC restrictions 
should affect crime only via a meth-labs reduction, conditional on the controls used in the 
analysis. Consequently, it is important to recognize that IV > OLS could be a signal that 
the exclusion restriction is violated. The reduced-form might not capture confounders 
positively correlated with the outcome variable of interest. 
While it seems hard to imagine that OTC regulations, (controlling the access to 
common medicines exclusively via quantity limits, sales environment constraints, proof 
of identification and logbooks), might have affected criminal activity trough other 
                                                
95 This might be considered as a lower bound for this analysis, if we assume that the extent of measurement error is 
higher in the attempt to measure an intrinsically covert activity as meth production using data on seizures, rather than 
FBI data for police employment.  
 96 A third possibility can be associated with the fact that the positive selection of domestic meth production in areas 
with increasing crime trends might be partially counterbalanced by the attempt to hide the illegal activities in areas with 
lower probability of detection by law enforcement agencies. 
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channels rather then the exit from the market of dangerous clandestine meth-labs, there 
might be potential threats to the validity of the exclusion restriction. 
 As already discussed, one potential threat relates to a change in the effort of police 
officers or agencies in cracking down dangerous meth-addicts. Moreover, big US 
producers could have flood the market with low-quality crystal meth. They could have 
done this either to extract profits from the new situation or to compensate the reduced 
availability of chemical precursors. This reduction in quality is shown in figure XIII-A) 
could have pushed segments of extreme abusers to reduce consumption and associate 
criminal behavior. 
Alternative Strategy 
 
County-level data on specific police effort and on purity of crystal meth are not 
available. However, to reduce the concerns that one of these potential general equilibrium 
effects might be playing a major role in the estimation, I implement the following 
strategy:  
1) I exclude from the estimating sample the set of treated counties that do not belong 
to the two top quintiles of the pre-determined distribution of meth-labs seizures in 2004. 
In this excluded sample it seems more likely that other confounding factors, rather then 
the closing of meth-labs (which were already very few) might have played an important 
role in the reduction in crime. Plausibly, these low-producing counties could have been 
exponentially affected by the flooding in the market of low-quality meth produced in US 
big labs. 
2) Using this sample of counties, I include a set of “bad” controls conceivably able to 
absorb unobserved confounding general equilibrium effects.  These are: arrests for sale 
and possession of other dangerous non-narcotics (which is a proxy for the police effort of 
crackdown on meth abusers), the number of police officers with arrests powers and with 
administrative duties, and the number of hospitalizations due to meth-abuse. 
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[Figure 14] 
Figure 14 shows the quintiles of a uniform distribution of meth-labs seizures in 2004 
(top panel) and the relative Kernel density estimate (bottom-panel), exclusively for 
counties belonging to treated states. The distribution of meth-labs seizures is positively 
skewed, with a median of 0.36, a mean of 6.07 and a standard deviation of 12.6. This 
denotes a great concentration of meth-labs in few counties within treated states.  
 
[Tables XVII (A - B)] 
Tables XVII-A and XVII-B show the OLS and IV results for property and violent 
crimes, respectively. This specification includes all counties in control states. As 
explained, I only include treated counties in the top 2 quintiles of the pre-determined 
distribution of meth-labs seizures in 2004. The first stage of this specification is stronger 
(-1.3 significant at the 1% level) with an F of the excluded instruments of 745.   
IV estimates show an elasticity of .05 to .1 significant for the case of larceny, burglary, 
rape, assault and murder. IV estimates are significant at the 1% level. These estimates are 
lower than the ones obtained in the full sample, effectively suggesting the presence of 
potentially unobserved GE effects. The distance between OLS and IV does not exceed 
1.3, with the only significant exception being rape. 
Table XVIII shows the IV regressions (again performed in the restricted sample of all 
controls and high-producing counties). This includes county FE and potentially “bad 
controls” already discussed.  
 
[Table XVIII] 
 
The magnitude of the estimates is reduced by around 20% but remains statistically 
significant at the 1% for burglaries and larceny, at the 5% for murder and rape and at the 
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10% for aggravated assault.97 
Overall, despite the difficult challenge to isolate the effects of clandestine labs on 
criminal activity, these estimates suggest that meth-labs have a direct effect on the 
propagation of criminal activity. This is quantifiable within an elasticity range of 0.1 to 
0.3.  
III. Other Results 
The CMEA Federal Act: A Further Experimental Design 
 
In this DD design I estimate the differences in criminal activity between 1) the set of 
Early Adopters states that implemented a law stricter than the CMEA federal act and 2) 
CMEA Only states.98  
This empirical designs aims to examine the effects of the federal act in CMEA Only 
states, eliminating the noise brought in the estimation by the set of Early Adopters states 
enacting a regulation softer than CMEA. States excluded in this empirical exercise – in 
fact – were practically subject to an upgrade of the intensity of the internal regulation. 
After the 30th of September 2006, CMEA (rather than softer states’ laws) was controlling 
the distribution of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine.  
The estimation strategy used is identical in the spirit of equation (2) and it is defined 
by the following equation: 
 𝑦!,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! + (𝐶𝑀𝐸𝐴 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!  )!"#"!!!""# 𝛽!,! + 𝜀!,!,!                          (10)  
 
                                                
      97 Chalfin and McCrary (2014) provide a review on the effects of police, punishment and legal market opportunities 
on crime, with a particular focus on papers from the last 20 years. This is useful to benchmark the estimated elasticity 
of meth-labs with other factors causing crime. Crime’s elasticity to unemployment is responsive is large for property 
crimes, less for violent crimes (1 to 6). For wage it falls within the interval (-0.3 to -0.9 for property and violent 
crimes). For prison population it lies within the interval (-0.1 to -0.7). Finally, the implied elasticity of sentence length 
is -0.5. 
 98 The states that enacted a stricter law then CMEA in 2005 are Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.  
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I define the indicator variable CMEA = 1 for CMEA Only states and CMEA = 0 for the 
pool of Early Adopters states that in 2005 enacted a legislation stricter then CMEA.  
Figure 15 shows the plot of the coefficients with the 95% confidence interval for 
larceny, burglary, aggravated assault and murder. Similarly to estimating equation (2) the 
omitted category is the interaction between the indicator variables “CMEA” and “year 
2004”. Outcome variables are expressed as the log normalized measure of crime per 
100,000 inhabitants. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
[Figure 15] 
For larceny (top-left corner) coefficients are significantly positive in 2005 and 2006. 
These are the years in which Early Adopters states enacted OTC regulations. This reflects 
the already discussed decline in crime in Early Adopters states due to OTC regulations 
implemented in 2005. A small and insignificant drop is observed in the year 2007. The 
coefficients are again significantly positive in 2009 and 2010.  
The analysis suggests the presence of some persistence in the effects of OTC 
regulations on larceny in Early Adopters states, but no significant effects in CMEA Only 
states. Coefficients associated with all the other crimes are not precisely estimated.99  
The absence of a significant effect might be reconciled with several explanations. 
From an econometric perspective, equation (1) is low-powered, due to the necessary 
restriction of the analysis on only 22 US states. From an economic standpoint instead, the 
absence of effects might be related to three main reasons. First, criminals’ ability to 
predict and to circumvent OTC restriction might have grown overtime, hence decreasing 
the crime-reducing effects of the laws. Second, low levels of domestic meth production, 
as shown in table III, characterized CMEA Only states. The legislation regulating 
methamphetamines had hence no impact on crime. Third, because of this reason, CMEA 
Only states might have paid less attention to the effective implementation of these laws. 
                                                
99 Results are not reported for brevity considerations only and are available upon request.  
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The Long Term Impact on Crime of OTC Restrictions 
 
In this empirical strategy, I include All US states in the analysis. I use the staggered 
implementation of the laws to examine the presence of the long run effects of OTC 
restrictions on crime.  
[Figure 16] 
 
The plot of the coefficients is shown in figure 16. The figure reveals a drop in crime 
after OTC restrictions. Coefficients are not precisely estimated. 
The effectiveness of this analysis is prevented by several factors that are context-
specific. First of all, the date of the enactment of the laws is often the same across states, 
both in terms of years and specific dates. Excluding Oklahoma and Utah, all the other 
states have implemented a law either in 2005 or in 2006. The high collinearity between 
the rollout dummy, year FE and the general decreasing trends in criminal activity 
prevents a clean identification of the effects of the laws on crime. Moreover, as discussed 
in the second DD design, more then 10 US states re-updated the internal law with the 
enactment of the CMEA, hence generating further imprecision and noise in the 
estimation. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Chapters III, IV and V offer one of the first systematic empirical investigations of the 
effects of the markets for illegal drugs on crime. Motivated by the richness of anecdotal 
evidence, I look at crystal methamphetamine, a neurotoxic powerful substance widely 
diffused in the United States. To address endogeneity concerns – (in the attempt to break 
the simultaneity circle connecting drug’s abuse and criminal propensity) – I use OTC 
restrictions as a source of exogenous variation. These limited the access to 
methamphetamine’s chemical precursors. These were used by extreme meth-addicts to 
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sustain their habit and the habits of their close network of acquaintances.  
Using a reduced-from DD design, I find that these regulations led to detect a sharp 
drop in property and violent crimes within the range of 5% to 10%. The analysis of the 
underlying mechanisms has provided the following insights: 1) a 38% drop in the number 
of meth-labs, mainly driven by a reduction on small-medium capacity labs; 2) a drop in 
murders due to violent altercations, but no effect on homicides due to systemic violence; 
3) no strong sign of relocation of criminal activity across borders, substitution in the 
demand or supply of other illegal substances, crackdown of police on meth-abusers. 
Overall, this paper supports the hypothesis that OTC restrictions impacted criminal 
activity mainly via the reduction in the intensive/extensive margin of consumption of 
segments of extreme meth-addicts. These are typically characterized by high criminal 
propensity when under the influence of this powerful substance. This work ultimately 
suggests that embedding the criminogenic effects deriving from illegal drugs’ abuse 
within the cost-benefit analysis developed in Becker (1968), can provide a richer 
framework through which analyzing criminal behavior’s production function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 140 
Figure 14: Kernel Density Meth-Labs Seizures 
 
 
NOTES: This figure shows the quantiles of a uniform distribution of the meth-labs 
seized by law-enforcement agencies in each county in 2004. Labs are normalized per 
100,000 people. 
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Figure 15: CMEA Federal Act As An Additional Experimental Design 
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NOTES: This figure shows the plot of the coefficients with the 90% confidence interval using 
estimating equation (10) for larceny, burglary, aggravated assault and murder. I use the following 
estimating equation: 𝑦!,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝑋!,!,!! 𝛽! + (𝐶𝑀𝐸𝐴 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!  )!"#"!!!""# 𝛽!,! + 𝜀!,!,!  .   I hence 
define the indicator variable CMEA = 1 for CMEA only states and CMEA=0 for the pool of early 
adopters states that in 2005 enacted a legislation stricter then CMEA. The omitted category is the 
interaction between the indicator variables “CMEA” and “year 2004”, outcome variables are 
expressed as the log normalized measure of crime per 100,000 inhabitants and standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. 
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Figure 16: The Long Run Effects of OTC Restrictions 
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                 NOTES: This figure shows the plot of the coefficients of a regression with dummies 
indication   the years to/from the implementation of the first OTC restriction in each 
state. Crime is expressed as the log normalized measure of crime per 100,000 
inhabitants and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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TABLE XV (First-Stage) 
The Effect of OTC Restrictions on Meth-Labs Seizures  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Baseline + County FE + County 
Observables 
    
Treated * Post -0.417*** -0.420*** -0.380*** 
 (0.0796) (0.0795) (0.0672) 
    
Observations 4,846 4,846 4,829 
R-squared 0.281 0.133 0.142 
Year FE 
State FE 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
County FE NO YES YES 
County Observables NO NO YES 
Number of counties 1,625 1,625 1,623 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard 
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the state level. The level of observation is county – year. 
This table reports the results of a difference in differences specification. The outcome variable is the 
number of meth-labs seized by law enforcement agencies and it expressed as ln(1+x) where x is the number 
of labs per 100,000 inhabitants. Data on labs are available from 2004 onwards. I interact the variable 
treated (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the provision of 
methamphetamine precursors chemicals) with the POST dummy (years 2005 and 2006). I consider as 
control counties, counties in States that only adopted the CMEA federal law (the last provision of the law 
took effect the 30th of September 2006. Column 1 shows the results for the baseline specification, when I 
include year FE and state FE. In column 2 I add to the baseline specification county FE. In column 3 I 
include all county observables.  
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TABLE XVI-A: OLS-IV Regressions 
Sample of all counties – Property Crimes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Larceny Burglary Vehicle Theft 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
Meth-Labs 0.0648*** 0.248*** 0.0464*** 0.224*** 0.0734*** 0.112 
 (0.0167) (0.0557) (0.0147) (0.0602) (0.0174) (0.0702) 
       
Observations 4,829 4,829 4,829 4,829 4,829 4,829 
R-squared 0.169 0.138 0.188 0.153 0.296 0.295 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County 
Observables 
F-Stat  
YES 
 
YES 
 
105.54 
YES 
 
YES 
 
105.54 
YES 
 
YES 
 
105.54 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors, 
reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the county level. The level of observation is county – year. This table reports 
the results of both the OLS and IV specification for Larceny, Burglary and Motor-Vehicle Theft. The endogenous 
variable is the number of meth-labs seized by law enforcement agencies. I use as instrument the interaction of the 
variable "Treated” (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the provision of 
methamphetamine precursors chemicals) with the “POST” dummy (years 2005 and 2006). I consider as control 
counties, counties in States that only adopted the CMEA federal law (the last provision of the law took effect the 30th 
of September 2006 Outcome variables and meth-labs are expressed as ln(1+x) where x is the relevant measure per 
100,000 inhabitants. Data on labs are available from 2004 onwards. The specification include year FE, state FE and 
all county observables. 
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TABLE XVI-B: OLS-IV Regressions 
Sample of all counties – Violent Crimes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Rape Assault Murder 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
Meth-Labs 0.0597*** 0.341** 0.0331** 0.185*** 0.0136 0.360** 
 (0.0209) (0.135) (0.0161) (0.0674) (0.0173) (0.144) 
       
Observations 4,829 4,829 4,829 4,829 4,829 4,829 
R-squared 0.189 0.147 0.311 0.292 0.172 0.075 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County 
Observables 
F-Stat  
YES YES 
105.54 
YES YES 
105.54 
YES YES 
105.54 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard 
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the county level. The level of observation is county – year. 
This table reports the results of both the OLS and IV specification for Rape, Assault and Murder. The 
endogenous variable is the number of meth-labs seized by law enforcement agencies. I use as instrument the 
interaction of the variable "Treated” (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has 
regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals) with the “POST” dummy (years 2005 
and 2006). I consider as control counties, counties in States that only adopted the CMEA federal law (the last 
provision of the law took effect the 30th of September 2006 Outcome variables and meth-labs are expressed 
as ln(1+x) where x is the relevant measure per 100,000 inhabitants. Data on labs are available from 2004 
onwards. The specification include year FE, state FE and all county observables. 
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TABLE XVII-A: OLS/IV Regression 
               Focus on top 40% Meth-producing Counties in Treated States  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Larceny Burglary Vehicle Theft 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
Meth-Labs 0.0654** 0.120*** 0.0557** 0.0997*** 0.0650*** 0.0459 
 (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0235) (0.0248) (0.0252) (0.0302) 
       
Observations 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188 
R-squared 0.211 0.209 0.229 0.227 0.345 0.345 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County 
Observables 
F-Stat  
YES YES 
 
745 
YES YES 
 
745 
YES YES 
 
745 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors, 
reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the county level. The level of observation is county – year. This table 
reports the results of both the OLS and IV specification for Larceny, Burglary and Motor-Vehicle Theft. The 
endogenous variable is the number of meth-labs seized by law enforcement agencies. I use as instrument the 
interaction of the variable "Treated” (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that has 
regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals) with the “POST” dummy (years 2005 and 
2006). I consider as control counties, counties in States that only adopted the CMEA federal law (the last 
provision of the law took effect the 30th of September 2006 Outcome variables and meth-labs are expressed as 
ln(1+x) where x is the relevant measure per 100,000 inhabitants. Data on labs are available from 2004 onwards. 
The specification include year FE, state FE and all county observables. I restrict the sample to the top 40% 
treated counties in the distribution of meth-labs seizures in 2004 and to all control counties. 
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TABLE XVII-B: OLS/IV Regression 
Focus on top 40% Meth-producing Counties in Treated States (Pre Intervention)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Rape Assault Murder 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
Meth-Labs 0.00795 0.129*** 0.0556** 0.0902*** 0.0509** 0.134** 
 (0.0309) (0.0473) (0.0246) (0.0274) (0.0241) (0.0521) 
       
Observations 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188 
R-squared 0.188 0.179 0.333 0.332 0.208 0.202 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County 
Observables 
F-Stat  
YES YES 
 
754 
YES YES 
 
754 
YES YES 
 
754 
   Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard 
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the county level. The level of observation is county – year. 
This table reports the results of both the OLS and IV specification for Rape, Assault and Murder. The 
endogenous variable is the number of meth-labs seized by law enforcement agencies. I use as instrument 
the interaction of the variable "Treated” (a dummy taking the value of 1 if the county belongs to a state that 
has regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals) with the “POST” dummy (years 
2005 and 2006). I consider as control counties, counties in States that only adopted the CMEA federal law 
(the last provision of the law took effect the 30th of September 2006 Outcome variables and meth-labs are 
expressed as ln(1+x) where x is the relevant measure per 100,000 inhabitants. Data on labs are available 
from 2004 onwards. The specification include year FE, state FE and all county observables. I restrict the 
sample to the top 40% counties in the distribution of meth-labs seizures in 2004 and to all control counties. 
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TABLE XVIII: IV Estimation (Top 40%) 
Robustness to County FE and Potentially “Bad” Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Larceny Burglary Vehicle 
Theft 
Murder Assault Rape 
       
Meth-Labs 0.0930*** 0.0799*** 0.0183 0.0972** 0.0536* 0.134** 
 (0.0253) (0.0264) (0.0340) (0.0474) (0.0321) (0.0578) 
       
Observations 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188 
Counties 731 731 731 731 731 731 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County 
Observables 
F-Stat 
YES 
580 
YES 
580 
YES 
580 
YES 
580 
YES 
580 
YES 
580 
Notes: ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors, 
reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the county level. The level of observation is county – year. This table 
reports the results of the IV specification. The endogenous variable is the number of meth-labs seized by law 
enforcement agencies. I use as instrument the interaction of the variable "Treated” (a dummy taking the value of 1 
if the county belongs to a state that has regulated the provision of methamphetamine precursors chemicals) with 
the “POST” dummy (years 2005 and 2006). I consider as control counties, counties in States that only adopted the 
CMEA federal law (the last provision of the law took effect the 30th of September 2006 Outcome variables and 
meth-labs are expressed as ln(1+x) where x is the relevant measure per 100,000 inhabitants. Data on labs are 
available from 2004 onwards. The specification include year FE, state FE and all county observables. I restrict 
the sample to the top 40% counties in the distribution of meth-labs seizures in 2004. I also include county FE, 
arrests for sale and possession of other dangerous non narcotics (the FBI category including crystal 
methamphetamines) and the state level number of hospitalizations due to meth-abuse. 
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